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Abstract		 As	a	philosophical	paradigm,	differential	heterogenesis	offers	us	a	novel	descriptive	vantage	with	which	to	inscribe	Deleuze’s	virtuality	within	the	terrain	of	“differential	becoming,”	conjugating	“pure	saliences”	so	as	to	parse	economies,	microhistories,	insurgencies,	and	epistemological	evolutionary	processes	that	can	be	conceived	of	independently	from	their	representational	form.	Unlike	Gestalt	theory’s	oppositional	constructions,	the	advantage	of	this	aperture	is	that	it	posits	a	dynamic	context	to	both	media	and	its	analysis,	rendering	them	functionally	tractable	and	set	in	relation	to	other	ob-jects,	rather	than	as	sedentary	identities.	Surveying	the	genealogy	of	differential	heterogenesis	with	particular	interest	in	the	legacy	of	Lautman’s	dialectic,	I	make	the	case	for	a	reading	of	the	Deleuzean	virtual	that	departs	from	an	event-oriented	approach,	galvanizing	Sarti	and	Citti’s	dynamic	a	priori	vis-à-vis	Deleuze’s	philosophy	of	difference.	Specifically,	I	posit	differential	heterogenesis	as	frame	with	which	to	examine	our	contemporaneous	epistemic	shift	as	it	relates	to	multi-scalar	computa-tional	modeling	while	paying	particular	attention	to	neuro-inferential	modes	of	inductive	learning	and	homologous	 cognitive	 architecture.	 Carving	 a	bricolage	between	Mark	Wilson’s	work	on	 the	“greediness	of	scales”	and	Deleuze’s	“scales	of	reality”,	this	project	threads	between	static	ecologies	and	active	externalism	vis-à-vis	endocentric	frames	of	reference	and	syntactical	scaffolding.	
		
Introduction:	Inheriting	Lautman’s	Differential		 Twentieth-century	 French	 philosopher	 of	 mathematics	 Albert	 Lautman	 (1908–1944)	contended	that	topology,	class	field	theory,	abstract	algebra,	and	analytic	number	theory	had	a	philosophical	backdrop	that	revealed	a	latent	dialectical	structure	of	which	previous	math-ematical	 developments	were	 bereft.	 Lautman’s	 dialectical	 interest	 in	 comprehending	 the	passage	from	essence	to	existence	concerns	ordering	the	logical	reconstruction	of	genesis	within	mathematics,	where	there	is	an	“intimate	bond	between	the	transcendence	of	ideas	and	the	immanence	of	the	logical	structure	of	the	solution	to	a	problem	within”	(Lautman	2011:	206).	 Invoking	Heidegger’s	concept	of	disclosure	(Erschlossenheit),	Lautman’s	“syn-thesis	of	the	real”	accords	the	extra-propositional	meaning	of	mathematics	within	the	pro-cessual	unfolding	of	its	imperative	“attachment”	to	metaphysics	(2011:	31-42,	200).	Thus,	the	determination	of	Lautman’s	Platonism	is	that	of	the	superordinate	dialectic,	where	cou-plets	(e.g.,	unity/multiplicity,	local/global,	continuity/discontinuity)	comprise	that	which	is	
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eternally	inaccessible	to	us	by	making	Ideas	“incarnate”.	Following	Lautman,	the	ontological	anteriority	of	the	“physical	real”	is	transcribed	through	mathematical	life	and	nurtured	via	a	series	of	“gestures”—material	reality	as	inchoate	matter	is	shaped	and	surpassed	through	non-material	forms.	According	to	Lautman’s	Platonism,	“ideal	reality”	is	not	found	in	the	ob-
jects	of	mathematical	theories	but	the	notions	that	the	development	of	these	theories	invoke.	These	ideas	translate	a	“non-sensible	reality”	from	which	mathematical	theories	are	taken	in	order	to	“describe	and	duplicate	an	ideal	reality”	(Reynolds	2010:	226).	With	Lautman’s	dialectic	construction	we	see	the	edifice	of	two	limit	conditions:	(i)	the	time	of	the	real,	where	we	can	have	physical	processes	which	are	generated	(and,	thus,	are	akin	to	chronologies);	(ii)	Platonic	Ideas	outside	of	time,	which	flow	in	an	immanent	mode.1	Lautman	was	 somewhat	 dissatisfied	with	 Plato’s	 dialectical	 conception	 of	 relation	 be-tween	Ideas	and	the	material	reality	through	which	they	are	realized,	augmenting	Plato	via	Heidegger.	Lautman’s	ultimate	claim	is	that	a	mathematical	entity’s	ontological	status	does	not	depend	upon	the	existence	of	“apparently	arbitrary	decisions	to	explore	some	sets	of	axioms	but	not	others”—rather,	it	is	the	case	that	“mathematicians	create	new	mathematical	structures	in	the	course	of	answering	questions	latent	in	the	underlying	extra-mathematical	dialectical	 order”	 (Larvor	 2011:	 199).	 Thus,	 a	 kind	 of	 primordial	 mathematical	 creation	emerges	through	the	dialectical	division	and	definition	of	differences,	the	unfolding	of	the	ontological	vis-à-vis	the	concrete	(or	ontic).2		Upending	the	hierarchical	relationship	of	the	infinitesimal	dialectic	as	a	dyadic	relation-ship	that	directly	determines	the	contingency	between	form	and	matter	(or	local	and	global),	Deleuze’s	 renderings	 of	 Lautman’s	 dialectic	 repurpose	 this	 relation	 as	 a	 scalar	 problem.	Thus,	 this	demonstrates	 the	 legacy	and	 influence	of	Lautman’s	asymptotic	approximation	upon	 Deleuze’s	 conception	 of	 undetermined	 differentials,	 or	 “infinitesimals”.	 Akin	 to	 the	Heideggerian	interpretation	of	Aletheia	(ἀλήθεια),	or	“unconcealedness”—whereby	the	re-vealing	of	Being	is	a	dynamic	differential	process—Lautman’s	rejection	of	truth	as	end-os-mosis	(final	resemblance),	in	refusing	the	adequacy	of	the	Idea	to	the	real,	engages	in	a	pro-cess	of	de-substantialization.	Thus	and	so,	displacement	becomes	 the	 foundational	meta-physical	relationship	to	binding	multiplicitous	of	form	with	matter;	Lautman’s	diagrammatic	“phase	space”	of	rigorous	structural	appropriation,	where	energetic	possibilities	govern	col-lective	behavior,	portends	Deleuze’s	fully	immanent	“virtual	multiplicities”.	
                                               1		 These	Platonic	Ideas	are	conditions	for	the	genesis	of	temporal	processes,	which	we	can	say	process	math-ematics	but	are	determined	by	Ideas	outside	of	history.		2		 Lautman	refers	to	Heidegger’s	1928	treatise	on	ontological	distinction,	On	the	Essence	of	Ground	(originally	published	in	1929),	in	order	to	articulate	an	interest	 in	the	difference	between	the	“ontic”	concepts	em-ployed	 in	 the	 sciences	 and	 the	 underlying	 “ontological”	 concepts	 disclosed	 by	 phenomenology.	 That	 is,	“Lautman	appeals	to	Heidegger	in	order	to	explain	the	relation	between	dialectics	and	mathematics.	The	whole	point	of	On	the	Essence	of	Ground	is	to	insist	on	the	ontological	difference,	that	is,	on	the	distinction	between	the	ontological	and	the	ontic.	The	division	of	 labour	between	the	scientist	and	the	philosopher	depends	on	this	distinction.	The	scientist	uses	ontic	concepts	to	establish	ontic	truths;	the	philosopher	re-veals	the	corresponding	ontology”	(Larvor	2011:	199).	
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As	 perhaps	made	most	 explicitly	 clear	 by	 Deleuze’s	 disjunctive	 synthesis,	 this	 “phase	space”	invokes	the	possibilities	of	a	system	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	its	“vector	field”.3	That	is,	these	“virtual	multiplicities”	are	akin	to	concrete	universals	rather	than	the	Aristotelian	scenography	of	“essences”	(i.e.,	abstract	archetypes).	Just	as	it	is	incorrect	to	reduce	“virtual	multiplicities”	to	the	“possible”,	so	too	the	“virtual”:		 […]	can	be	distinguished	from	the	‘possible’	from	at	least	two	points	of	view.	From	a	cer-tain	point	of	view,	in	fact,	the	possible	is	the	opposite	of	the	real,	it	is	opposed	to	the	real;	but,	in	quite	a	different	opposition,	the	virtual	is	opposed	to	the	actual	[….]	The	possible	has	no	reality	(although	it	may	have	an	actuality);	conversely,	the	virtual	is	not	actual,	but	as	such	possesses	a	reality	[….]	Here	again	Proust’s	formula	best	defines	the	states	of	virtuality:	‘real	without	being	actual,	ideal	without	being	abstract.’	(Deleuze	1991:	96)		Deleuze	thus	distinguishes	the	virtual	from	the	possible	as	what	is	irreducible	to	the	actual	but,	nonetheless,	is	granted	the	privileged	status	of	“immateriality”	while,	simultaneously,	being	fully	real.	These	virtual	multiplicities	are	crucial	to	our	conception	of	differential	het-erogenesis,	shining	a	light	on	the	non-observable	relation	between	differential	elements,	a	relation	signifying	lines	of	individuation.	These	singularities	serve	as	points	of	attraction	for	a	system,	which	are	themselves	never	actualized—as	ideal	singularities,	they	“enjoy	an	‘im-material’	status	insofar	as	they	define	the	tendencies	composing	a	vector	field	without	being	themselves	ever	actualized,	functioning	thus	as	the	intensive	‘differentiator’	responsible	for	spatio-temporal	individuation”	(Sacilotto	2020:	38).	The	“attractive”	facet	of	these	singular-ities	serves	as	warning	to	not	confuse	Deleuze’s	disjunctive	synthesis	with	Heraclitean	eter-nal	flux,	where	world-order	(kosmos)	is	caught	in	constant	and	significant	change.	Further	distinguishing	Deleuze’s	virtual	as	a	twofold	of	body	and	desire,	we	see	that	it	is	immersed	within	the	active	unity	of	interior	change,	with	its	unconscious	“factory”	steeped	in	the	(dia-lectical)	process	of	both	being	the	ground	for	generation	and	being	generated,	itself	(Deleuze	1990:	90).4	However,	considering	the	aforementioned	gradient	of	difference	between	possi-bility	 and	 actuality,	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 active	 difference	 in	 kind	 between	 virtuality	 and	
                                               3		 This	disjunctive	synthesis,	which	follows	the	connective	synthesis	and	is	followed	by	the	conjunctive	syn-thesis	(or	the	“third	synthesis”),	illuminates	“recording”,	“registration”,	and	“inscription”.	4		 We	ought	to	be	very	prudent	with	how	we	attribute	the	use	of	the	term	“dialectical”	to	Deleuze.	While	the	virtual	can	be	bifurcated	within	a	twofold	dialectic	logic	qua	its	relational	structure,	this	can	not	be	extended	to	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology.	Consider,	for	instance,	Deleuze’s	fundamental	assertion	in	Two	Regimes	of	
Madness—that	everything	is	a	machine,	whether	it	is	“real,	contrived	or	imaginary”	(Deleuze	2006a:	17).	This	demonstrates	that	the	machinic	assemblage	is	infrastructural—wherefore	it	does	not	exercise	a	hier-archical	circuitry	of	linealities	and	supervenience—but	here	we	must	note	that	Deleuze’s	invocation	of	“me-chanic”	does	not	describe	a	mechanical	domain	that	is	set	in	opposition	to	an	“organic”	(or	“non-mechani-cal”)	domain.	Similarly,	when	considering	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology,	the	“organic”	domain	ought	not	be	set	within	a	dialectic	relation	to	the	“non-organic”	machine.	Thus,	the	Deleuzean	machine	ontology	is	one	set	within	immanent	“univocity,	meaning	that	there	is	no	biosphere	or	noosphere	but	everywhere	the	same	Mechanosphere”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	2005:	69).		
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actuality.	Therefore,	any	machine	encounter’s	“plurality	of	forces	acting	and	being	affected”	occurs	at	a	“distance,	distance	being	the	differential	element	included	in	each	force	and	by	which	each	is	related	to	others”	(Deleuze	2006b:	208).		Such	is	the	foundational	semblance	of	differential	heterogenesis,	where	the	becoming	of	the	a	priori	is	linked	to	a	pluralized	mathematical	description	of	the	emergence	and	creation	of	forms.	Without	any	need	for	stabilization,	differential	heterogenesis	offers	a	“first	refer-ring	system”	for	heterogenic	flow	that,	in	turn,	allows	the	emergence	of	the	semiotic	function	from	dynamic	evolution	without	the	need	of	any	stabilization;	as	applied	to	fields	such	as	semantics,	this	allows	for	a	methodology	opposite	to	the	classical	case	of	structural	morpho-dynamics	(Sarti	et	al.	2018:	2-3).	Accordingly,	conditions	are	not	given,	a	priori,	within	a	de-finitive	set	of	possibilities,	allowing	for	us	to	take	account	of	the	historical	variation	of	“phase	space”	and	the	set	of	all	possible	trajectories.	Rather	than	being	limited	to	mapping	already	possible	trajectories,	all	machines-cum-rhizomes	are	irreducible	entities	where	any	“homog-
enous	system”	is	necessarily	“already	affected	by	a	regulated,	continuous,	immanent	process	of	
variation”	that,	in	the	last	instance,	contracts	virtuality	into	a	differential	relation	of	manifes-tation	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1983:	103).			
The	Differential’s	Processual	Development		Lautman’s	dialectic	is	extended	in	two-part	form	via	the	concrete	genesis	of	reality	and	immanent	Ideas	according	to	Levi	R.	Bryant’s	externality	thesis,	as,	for	Deleuze,	“[e]very	ob-ject	is	double	without	it	being	the	case	that	the	two	halves	resemble	one	another”	(Bryant	2011:	66).	 Exacting	 a	 further	 partition,	 for	Arjen	Kleinherenbrink,	 this	 “double”	 is,	 itself,	“doubled”	once	more,	resulting	in	a	“fourfold”.	Accordingly,	this	“fourfold”	world	consists	of	a	twofold	virtual	depth	and	a	twofold	actual	surface,	where	distinction	is	carved	along	“unity	of	the	multiple”	in	the	“objective	sense”	and,	on	the	other	end,	a	“multiplicity	‘of’	one	and	a	unity	‘of’	the	multiple,	but	now	in	a	subjective	sense”	(Deleuze	1994:	145).	The	virtual,	irre-ducible,	or	“objective”	aspect	of	every	entity	is,	thus,	one	and	multiple	at	the	same	time;	con-tra	the	ontological	structure	of	the	actual,	the	(two)	aspects	of	the	virtual	concern	themselves	with	the	non-relational	being	of	a	machine.	If	it	is	from	Spinoza	that	Deleuze	inherits	Oneness	(albeit	sans	Spinoza’s	divine	connection)	and	from	Leibniz	that	Deleuze	becomes	heir	to	the	thesis	of	the	multiple,	then	it	is	by	way	of	Husserl	that	Deleuze	finds	himself	working	with	qualitative	distinction	re:	objects	that	are	demarcated	from	their	semblance	via	subjective,	relational,	or	actual	encounters,	events,	or	experiences	(i.e.,	“distinguishing	this	from	that”;	Kleinherenbrink	2019:	39).		Grounding	individual	entities	within	processes,	for	Deleuze	these	processes	are	not	de-termined	as	continuous	universals	or	understood	via	an	underlying	event	existing	“in	addi-tion	 to	 machines”	 (40).	 Deleuze’s	 conception	 of	 process	 is	 tripartite:	 first,	 there	 is	 no	
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transcendent	factor	that	connects	machines	and,	second,	there	is	no	distinction	between	man	and	nature;	what	both	these	factors	demonstrate	is	that	“process”	evinces	how	machinic	be-ing	“happens	everywhere”;	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	Deleuzean	machinic	process	is	that	the	process,	itself,	is	not	an	“end	in	itself,	nor	must	it	be	confused	with	an	infinite	per-petuation	of	itself”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1983:	15).	This	evidences	that	the	schizo-process	is	not	a	continuous,	universal,	or	underlying	event	 that	exists	 in	addition	to	machinology.	 In	both	Bryant	and	Kleinherenbrink’s	formulation,	Deleuze’s	externality	thesis	states	that	all	entities	have	an	extra-relational	aspect,	a	residue	of	excess	and	superfluity.	Devoid	of	a	uni-versal	background,	externality	is	necessarily	composed	of	a	processes	that	consists	of	breaks	and	 stops/cuts,	 whereby	 permanence,	 emergence,	 production,	 generation,	 and	 change	emerge	as	passive	syntheses	of	time:		 [t]hey	describe	how	one	entity	relates	to	another	(connection),	how	it	manages	to	do	so	while	remaining	irreducible	(disjunction),	and	how	new	entities	are	created	(conjunc-tion).	They	are	‘temporal’	because	they	account	for	how	things	happen;	‘passive’	because	they	 are	 independent	of	memory,	 understanding	will,	 recognition	 and	 consciousness;	‘productive’	because	they	account	for	the	forging	of	relations;	‘registrative’	because	they	account	for	the	alteration	of	individual	essences;	and	‘consumptive	because	they	account	for	the	birth	and	death	of	entities.	These	syntheses	are	not	successive,	but	always	‘over-lap’[….]	A	human	spotting	a	friend	is	a	case	of	the	 three	syntheses,	but	so	is	a	meteor	striking	the	moon,	or	my	finger	striking	my	keyboard.	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	41)		Recall	 that,	 according	 to	Deleuze’s	 philosophical	 system,	 the	 “actual”	 indicates	 assem-blages	as	they	are	experienced	by	other	machines	while,	conversely,	the	“virtual”	denotes	the	extra-relational	(or	non-relational)	reality	of	machines.	Kleinherenbrink’s	fourfold	sys-tem	is	the	result	of	a	further	qualification	resulting	from	the	bifurcation	of	the	actual/virtual	
with	 the	 One/multiple;	 as	 it	 concerns	 the	 non-relational	 unity	 of	what	 Deleuze	 calls	 “the	body”,	we	are	thus	particularly	interested	in	what	remains	external	to	relations	between	ma-
chines.	Accordingly,	“[a]s	everything	is	a	machine,	so	everything	is	a	body”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	87).	That	is,	we	are	not	to	understand	bodies	as	physical,	biological,	psychic,	social,	or	verbal	machines	(despite	these	systems	do	all	have	bodies)	but,	instead,	understand	that	ex-ternality	demands	that	all	entities	are	 formally	 identical	 in	 their	having	a	body,	where	by	“body”	we	mean	“a	transcendental	unity,	irreducible	to	relational	dimensions	such	as	his-tory,	possibilities,	composition,	empirical	qualities,	users,	and	functions”	(87).	It	is	precisely	due	to	the	impossibility	of	full	integration	that	these	machines	are	“bodies	without	organs”	(BwO).	This	guarantees	that	no	machine	can	become	fully	integrated	in	any	one	relation	but	that	every	machine,	instead,	is	a	site	of	protest,	or	“anti-production”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1983:	19).	As	Jacques	Rancière	comments	on	Deleuze’s	machinic	process,	it	is	by	isolating	the	 figure	that	we	prevent	 it	 from	becoming	networked	as	an	element	within	a	circuit	or	
LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421-3098	N.	11/2020	–	DIFFERENTIAL	HETEROGENESIS	
 
 207	
serving	 as	 an	 idempotent	 and	 indexical	 resemblance	 of	 something	 other	 than	 an	 object	(Rancière	1998:	525-536).		The	virtual	body,	for	Deleuze,	is	never	pronounced	in	actual	relations,	which	is	to	say	that	it	cannot	be	integrated	into	manifestations	qua	relations	and,	therefore,	it	is	the	virtual	that	is	enveloped	by	its	relations.	Despite	bodies	are	irreducible	to	relational	manifestations,	these	relations,	nevertheless,	 transpire	vis-à-vis	 appearance.	Therefore,	despite	being	a	 “closed	vessel”,	the	virtual	twofold	is	not	immune	to	the	evental	nature	of	the	world	(Kleinheren-brink	2019:	97).	Thus,	on	the	one	hand	there	are	the	“the	virtuals	that	define	the	immanence	of	the	transcendental	field”	and,	on	the	other,	“the	possible	forms	that	actualize	them	and	transform	 them	 into	 something	 transcendent”	 (Deleuze	 2005:	 32).	 The	 process	 of	differential	actualization	thus	follows	the	plane	of	the	virtual,	which	gives	assemblages	their	particular	reality.	Deleuze	plucks	genetic	encoding	for	his	case	study	whereby	such	“differential	relations”	unfold	and	through	which	virtual	multiplicities	are	subsequently	composed	into	unique	ac-tualities.	Accordingly,	 the	axes	of	 the	non-algebraic	differential	 tensors	“are	 incarnated	at	once	in	a	species	and	the	organic	parts	of	which	it	[morphogenesis]	is	composed”	(Deleuze	1994:	206).	Similarly,	Sarti	and	Citti’s	model	of	differential	heterogenesis	provides	us	with	a	mathematical	description	of	 the	emergence	and	creation	of	(particular)	 forms,	whereby	a	
priori	conditions	are	not	definitively	predetermined	but,	instead,	akin	to	the	interference	of	two	wave	packet	“colliding”	during	quantum	superposition.5	Hence,	differential	heterogen-esis	allows	us	to	consider	the	becoming	process	of	 the	a	priori	without	committing	to	the	Kantian	transcendental	decision	which	contends	that	substance	is	a	stable	but	uncontended	and	unreachable	a	priori	category	of	mind	that	is	imposed	on	the	chaotic	manifold	of	move-ment	into	form.	Instead,	while	differential	morphogenesis	does,	indeed,	retain	the	“boundary	concept”	of	the	Kantian	noumena—after	all,	we	must	infer	the	pre-conceptual	differential	space’s	existence	and,	thus,	it	remains	as	a	“thought-object”	(ens	rationis)—it	is	freed	from	Kant’s	apophatic/negative	and	regulative	use.	This	is	akin	to	protein	encoding	in	DNA,	where	DNA	and	RNA	nucleotide	sequences	"translate"	the	amino	acids	that	they	represent.	Like	the	possibility	space	of	genetic	encoding,	differential	heterogenic	composition	grants	lays	the	conditions	for	immanent	fixity,	the	dynamic	space	of	possibility	producing	“the	differential	
                                               5		 According	to	the	superposition	state	of	quantum	theory	constituent	particles	exist	in	different	states	simul-taneously	and	are	thus	superposed	(as	intact/decayed)	at	the	same	time.	This	is	reified	in	the	Schrödinger’s	cat	thought	experiment	and	the	Everett	many-worlds	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	which	posits	the	real	existence	of	parallel	physical	worlds	(therein	suggesting	that	there	exists	an	innumerable	and	unlimited	multiverse).	Accordingly,	as	soon	as	a	quantum	system	is	observed,	there	is	a	reduction	of	the	wave	packet	and	this	quantum	system	performs	a	measurement-induced	reduction—i.e.,	decoherence	of	the	“superpo-sition”.	This	operation	is	invoked	by	Sarti	and	Citti’s	description	of	the	Deleuzean	assemblage’s	evolution	in	relation	to	the	emergence	of	the	semiotic	function	by	way	of	E/C	and	heterogenetic	flow	without	the	need	of	any	stabilization:	“[t]ogether	with	a	morphogenesis	in	the	space,	we	have	also	a	morphogenesis	of	the	space,	since	assemblages	are	continuously	evolving”	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	3).	François	Laruelle’s	recent	litera-ture	is	also	privy	to	conceiving	of	the	real	qua	quantum	superposition.	
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constraints	[that]	determine	the	universality	of	laws	and	the	nomological	character	of	differ-ential	models”	in	antecedent	fashion	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	6).		
	
	
The	Differential’s	Processual	Relations		For	Deleuze,	the	transcendental	illusion	is	generated	in	the	behaviour	through	which	ob-jects	relate	to	one	another	and,	consequentially,	how	“the	states	‘experienced’	by	a	system	are	treated	as	other	objects	 themselves,	rather	than	system-specific	entities	generated	by	the	organization	of	the	object	itself”	(Bryant	2011:	102).	According	to	this	construction,	en-tities	“have	their	manifestations	in	relations	to	others,	plus	their	non-relational	interior	con-stitution”	 (42).	 This	 relation,	 which	 Bryant	 terms	 an	 “onto-cartography”,	 is	 formulated	around	the	relational	appearance	of	entities	vis-à-vis	other	relations,	as	opposed	to	their	pri-vate	(virtual)	being	(Bryant	2008).	Bryant’s	reading	of	Deleuze	emphasizes	Deleuze’s	cri-tique	of	presence—the	belief	 that	 the	experience	of	an	entity	 is	 identical	 to	 its	Being—by	showing	 how	Deleuze	 disentangles	presentist	 (or	 event-oriented)	 philosophical	 positions	that	reduce	reality	to	the	thoughts	concerning	it.		Following	Lautman,	Kleinherenbrink,	and	Bryant,	we	can	contextualize	Deleuze’s	differ-ential	entity	as	a	means	of	characterizing	machinic	manifestation	while	prioritizing	relation,	itself.6	By	invoking	Sarti	and	Citti,	we	can	further	note	that	differential	heterogenesis	as	such	does	not	position	or	present	the	“thing-in-manifestation”	as	reducible	to	subject-object	in-ternal	conditions	(e.g.,	the	perceptual	experience	of	an	object	and	its	qualities).	Rather,	the	manifestation	of	an	entity	is	never	a	single,	homogenous	milieu	or	phenomenon	but	(differ-entially)	split	between	qualitative	rhythms/processes—nested	within	its	agentive	material	dimension—and	the	content	of	its	experience	(Bryant	2014:	96).	This	bifurcation	delineates	“the	qualities	characterizing	an	experience	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	other	hand	the	uni-fied	thing—immanent	to	the	relation—of	which	they	are	qualities”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	45).		What	then,	is	to	be	said	of	the	non-relational	or	private	interior	of	entities?	In	accordance	with	Deleuze’s	terms,	the	interior	being	of	a	machine	is	necessarily	unified	with	its	multiplic-ity,	preventing	continuity.	The	diverse	world	of	experience	is	thus	regarded	not	as	a	single,	continuous,	or	homogenous	mass	but	an	antecedent.	In	short,	externality	evinces	a	strict	dis-continuity	between	interior	being	qua	immediacy	and	interior	being	qua	exigency.	
                                               6		 As	of	2016,	Bryant	has	renounced	the	object-oriented	externality	thesis	where	entities	are	withdrawn	from	each	other	and	considered	as	irreducible	to	relations.	As	he	remarks	in	“For	an	Ethics	of	the	Fold”,	the	“fold-ing-transformation”	affirms	that	that	which	is	discrete	is	but	a	“fold”	within	a	wider	field;	here,	Bryant	now	underscores	knots	of	locality	along	a	single	integrated	continuum	(i.e.,	the	dynamic	dimension	and	the	on-going	activity	of	the	“pleat”).	Bryant	thus	remarks	that	“[b]odies	are	not	discrete,	but	continuous	with	their	worlds"	which	shows	that,	if	the	externality	holds,	“then	entities	are	split	between	relational	manifestations	and	their	private	being”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	47).	
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Deleuze’s	model	of	differential	virtuality	upturns	causal	relations	as	lateral	or	horizontal	processes	between	objects	whereby	actual	terms	can	be	reduced	to	an	apparent	transcen-
dental	illusion.	As	Bryant	remarks,	the	“virtual	works	vertically	from	the	implicate	to	the	ex-plicate”	 (2011:	 64).	 Similarly,	 Deleuze’s	 conceptualization	 of	 genes,	 which	 are	 linked	 to-gether	 in	 interdependent	 and	 complex	 reticulations	 and	 interdependencies—an	 “endo-structure”—	underscores	how	virtuality	shapes	the	conditions	that	the	form	of	the	organism	of	becoming	will	take,	where	differential	“becoming”	in	no	way	resembles	the	organism	(with	organism	as	a	metonym	for	“actualization”).		As	Deleuze	remarks	in	Difference	and	Repetition,	“[t]he	virtual	is	opposed	not	to	the	real	but	to	the	actual.	The	virtual	is	fully	real	in	so	far	as	it	is	virtual”	(1994:	208).	This	fundamen-tal	 tenant	of	 virtuality	demonstrates	 that	 the	differential	 is	 coordinated	by	 a	manifold	of	points	and	nodes,	channeled	within	processes	“yielding	a	variety	of	actual	entities	with	very	different	metric	properties”	(De	Landa,	in	Duffy	2006:	246).7	Moving	beyond	topology,	we	can	 also	 note	 that	 rather	 than	 the	macro-political	 rigid	 terrain	 (of	Marx	 and	Durkheim),	Deleuze’s	differential	micro-sociology	probes	insurrectional	political	zones	of	indiscernibly,	such	as	the	“subrepresentative”	realm	of	the	“masses	and	the	quantum	flows	of	belief”	and	the	“desire	and	fear	that	govern	them”	(Holland,	in	Somers-Hall	et	al.	2018:	173).	In	short,	Deleuze’s	“body	without	organs”	denotes	the	non-relational	unity	of	a	machine,	whether	it	concerns	surface	structure	or	sociologically-considered	political	behavior.	If,	then,	it	is	not	actualities	that	figure	into	distinction,	how	do	we	distinguish	this	body	from	that	body?	This	“desire”	is	what	renders	relational	manifestations	and,	therefore,	it	is	defined	in	terms	of	power;	“desire”	is	the	virtual	latent	content	empowering	the	manifest	content	of	actuality—thus,	Deleuze’s	conception	of	the	machine	is	as	a	“desiring-machine”	(Deleuze	1977:	132).	The	machine’s	“desire”	is	its	private	reality,	which	cannot	be	directly	experienced	 by	 anything	 else	 and	 is	 not	 empirically	 available;	 nor	 is	 it	 encountered	 and,	therefore,	it	is	transcendental—machinic	desire	is	what	gives	actuality	to	a	machine	without,	itself,	being	such	an	actuality.		This	conception	of	“desire”,	much	like	the	body	without	organs,	belongs	to	the	virtual	as-pect	of	entities	and	indexes	the	unconscious	relation	of	physics/physical	relations	through	the	aperture	of	 internal	matter	(Deleuze	1994:	106).	For,	 if	 the	externality	 thesis	holds,	 it	means	that	there	is	necessarily	something	about	entities	outside	of	such	relations—i.e.,	an	internality,	which	Deleuze	defines	as	“[s]ubmolecular,	unformed	matter”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	2005:	503).	The	virtual	corresponds	to	puissance,	a	particular	articulation	of	power	that	is	non-relational	 and	 can	 be	 experienced	 and	 described	 indirectly—for	 Aristotle,	 this	 com-prised	 a	 (secondary)	 understanding	 of	 the	 potentiality	 of	 the	 many	 which,	 unlike	 the	
                                               7		 Culling	visual	instantiations	of	such	distributed	topological	nodes	of	singularity,	Manuel	de	Landa	harvests	images	of	dynamic	curvature:	“soap	bubbles,	crystals	of	a	variety	of	shapes,	light	rays	and,	indeed,	certain	mathematical	objects”,	such	as	those	comprising	Poincaré’s	non-linear	geometry—dips,	nodes,	focal	points,	centres	(de	Landa,	in	Duffy	2006:	240,	246).	
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potentiality	of	the	one,	comprises	internal	diversity	as	well	as	being	at	the	heart	of	the	entire	spectrum	of	its	actualizations.	Drawing	from	Gilbert	Simondon’s	notion	of	pre-individuality,	which	is	neither	reducible	to	chronology	nor	history—though	not	disparate	from	either—and	directing	this	study	towards	topological	space,	rather	than	extensive	space,	Deleuze’s	differential	conception	of	the	virtual	is	necessarily	as	it	is	set	in	relation	to	the	entity	in-itself,	or	as	a	meta-stable	system	of	non-personal	and	a-conceptual	singularities	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	156).	That	is,	“desire”	is	pre-individual	because	it	is	populated	with	intensive	“singu-larities”,	“code”,	“desire”,	or	an	“Idea”,	rather	than	with	the	objects	of	experience.	In	particu-lar,	when	Deleuze	calls	this	potentiality	the	“Idea”—a	pure	virtuality	that	does	not	resemble	its	own	actualizations—it	is	because	he	is	describing	“the	real	with	becoming	actual,	differ-
entiated	 without	 being	 differentiated,	 and	 complete	 without	 being	 entire”	 (Deleuze	 1994:	214).	Due	to	this	externality	thesis,	relations	are	external	to	terms	and	every	machine	has	an	excess	that	seeks,	or	“desires”,	an	extra-relational	“beyond”—therefore,	excess	is	differenti-ated,	as	Deleuze’s	system	is	not	one	of	machinic	univocity	but	one	where	every	machine	is	a	
multiplicity:	“singular	without	being	a	unit	of	something	and	diverse	without	being	a	diver-sity	of	things	[….]	Desire	is	the	private	reality	of	entities	and	in	this	sense	[….]	internal	reality	is	a	machine’s	matter,	its	substance,	and	its	essence”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	165).		As	Deleuze’s	virtual	is	necessarily	defined	as	a	strict	part	of	the	real	object,	its	“desire”	stitches	together	essence,	substance,	and	matter.8	For	Deleuze,	following	Husserl	once	more,	essence	refers	not	to	a	simple	object	of	experience	but	to	the	body’s	internal	reality,	distinct	from	“sensible	things”	and,	thus,	is	“morphological”,	“nomadic”,	and	“vagabond”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1983:	167).		Much	like	the	non-localizable	nature	of	observation	as	it	relates	to	differential	heterogen-esis,	there	is	a	peculiar	vagabond	nature	to	the	virtual’s	twofold	property	of	“being	and	not	being	where	they	are,	wherever	they	go”	(Deleuze	1997:	126).	It	is	designated	as	such	be-cause	 the	 virtual	 is	 intensive,	while	 an	 actuality	 is	 always	 extensive	 and,	 thus,	 articulated	through	precisely	where	and	when	it	is,	encountered	in	relations	and	nowhere	else—“[m]y	keyboard	is	beneath	my	hand	and	on	my	desk.	A	song	is	in	a	room.	An	organ	is	in	an	organism.	Soldiers	fight	in	wars	and	drones	hover	over	weddings”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	169-170).	Drawing	 from	 Deleuze,	 our	 transcendental	 (i.e.,	 the	 transcendental	 of	 differential	
                                               8		 Here,	we	significantly	depart	from	Manuel	de	Landa’s	assertion	that	Deleuze	is	not	a	realist	about	essences.	As	we	shall	show,	in	some	sense	de	Landa	takes	Kleinherenbrink’s	reading	of	Deleuze	to	the	extreme;	Klein-herenbrink,	reading	Deleuze	as	an	object-oriented	philosopher,	makes	the	case	that	we	should	avoid	desig-nating	Deleuze’s	ontology	(or,	more	specifically,	circumscribing	the	virtual)	from	the	perspective	of	the	met-aphysics	proposed	in	Difference	and	Repetition	because	Deleuze,	rather	than	“positing	supra-individual	vir-tual	structures”	migrates	essences	“into	the	interior	of	machines	and	shows	why	essence	is	malleable	rather	than	fixed”,	which	is	how	Deleuze	unburdens	himself	from	the	“classical”	conception	of	eternal	essences	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:179).	As	we	shall	show,	however,	de	Landa	takes	this	logic	even	further,	overdeter-mining	the	“prepatterning	of	a	possible	successive	stratification”,	such	that	de	Landa’s	assemblage	theory	is	no	longer	compatible	with	differential	heterogenesis,	as	it	disrobes	the	externality	thesis	for	the	full	tyr-anny	of	internality,	rendering	correlative	compatibility	impossible	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	18).	
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heterogenesis)	is	not	that	of	the	Kantian	subject	or	the	Husserlian	ego	but	understood	as	the	virtual	aspect	of	a	machine,	itself.		Thus,	no	relation,	human	or	non-human—including	perception,	description,	art,	science,	myth,	or	mathematics—can	attain	the	complex	internal	distribution	of	singularities	or	flow	of	desire	that	is	immanent	to	a	machine.	Instead,	these	relations	solely	produce	that	which	“generates	a	machine,	that	which	a	machine	generates,	or	the	actual	qualities	that	it	mani-fests”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	173).	This	is	all	to	say	that	the	schizophrenia	of	reality	is	that	everything	is	a	machine	that	has	its	own	internal	reality	(that	is,	an	“essence”)	irreducible	to	its	manifestations	in	relations,	an	extra-relational	non-being	that	is	indexed	by	the	machine’s	having	a	body	(otherwise	termed	a	“problem”,	“figure”,	or	“vessel”)	with	powers	(“desire”,	“singularities”,	“Idea”,	or	“code”).	Notably,	while	the	“technical”	and	“social”	aspect	of	ma-chines	concerns	their	actuality,	“desire”	is	“molecular”	and,	therefore,	it	is	opposed	to	social	and	technical	machines,	which	are	“molar”.	Due	to	the	diffracted	partiality	of	machinization,	every	machine	is	a	“desiring-machine	in	one	sense”,	but,	also,	an	organic,	technical,	or	social	machine	in	another	sense;	in	turn,	“these	are	the	same	machines	under	determinate	condi-tions”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1983:	387).		
	
	
Differential	Heterogenesis	vs.	de	Landa’s	Internalist	Ontology				With	“[l]anguage	as	[necessarily]	situated”	and	a	product	of	the	intensive	dimension	of	becoming,	the	Deleuze	of	differential	heterogenesis	is	posed	along	the	fulcrum	of	interactiv-ity	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	7).	How	does	the	Deleuze	of	differential	heterogenesis	depart	from	the	Deleuze	utilized	by	contemporary	Deleuzeans,	or	“post-Deleuzeans”,	a	ragtag	amalgam	of	philosophers	whom	we	will	soon	unravel?		First	and	foremost,	despite	we	retain	a	naturalized	internal	reference	system	and,	thus,	sail	with	a	zephyr	of	scientific	rationalism,	our	Deleuze	is,	indeed,	quite	alien	from	how	Ma-nuel	de	Landa’s	“assemblage	theory”	renders	Deleuze.	De	Landa	outpouches	essence	and	de-nies	that	assemblages	are	reducible	to	their	parts	and	environments,	such	that	entities	are	always	external	to	their	relations	(de	Landa	2013:	4,	10).	De	Landa	denies	that	internal	es-sences	(or	the	virtual)	exist(s)	while	insisting	upon	irreducible	individual	entities	(or	assem-blages)	that	exist	at	all	scales	of	reality.	Emphasizing	“dispositions”,	or	the	fully	real,	albeit	contingent,	“tendencies”	and	“capacities”	of	an	assemblage,	de	Landa’s	realist	and	internalist	ontology	seeks	to	determine	how	no	entity	can	be	reduced	to	its	virtual	relations	(or	“dia-gram”)	with	other	beings,	as	the	“ontological	status	of	any	assemblage,	inorganic,	organic,	or	social,	is	that	of	a	unique,	singular,	historically	contingent	individual”	(10,	40).	Purely	nomi-nal	 in	 difference,	 by	 “tendencies”,	 de	 Landa	 means	 that	 which	 allows	 an	 assemblage	 to	change	what	it	is	doing	(e.g.,	water	freezing	into	ice	as	temperature	drops)	and	by	“capaci-ties”,	 he	 is	 referring	 to	 that	 which	 allows	 for	 novel	 actualization	 (e.g.	 a	 plant’s	 leaves	
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becoming	poisonous	after	one	chews	them).	By	reducing	the	virtual	to	structure,	de	Landa’s	system	hinges	on	the	critical	threshold	of	finite	spaces	of	possibilities	or	material	"tenden-cies”,	prodding	the	once	indeterminate	“phase	space”	(of	Lautman)	towards	various	modes	of	stability	(“steady,	cyclic,	turbulent”);	for	example,	the	virtual,	as	such,	gives	direction	to:		 […]	critical	thresholds	of	melting	and	vaporisation,	which	has	a	reality	beyond	the	actual.	These	critical	thresholds	are	one	example	of	a	distribution	of	singularities,	the	term	‘sin-gular’	meaning	remarkable	or	non-ordinary,	a	special	event	in	which	a	change	in	quantity	becomes	a	change	in	quality.	(de	Landa	2015:	19)			Antithetical	to	any	type	of	essentialism,	de	Landa	counters	the	Aristotelian	taxonomy	that	essentializes	species	and	genera	as,	for	de	Landa,	an	assemblage	is	defined	by	the	full	history	of	all	that	has	featured	its	constitution,	with	a	species	understood	as	an	“individual	entity	as	unique	and	singular	as	the	organisms	that	compose	it,	but	larger	in	spatiotemporal	scale	[….]	individual	organisms	are	the	component	parts	of	a	larger	individual	whole,	not	the	particular	members	of	a	general	category	or	natural	kind”	(de	Landa	2013:	28).	For	de	Landa,	the	“dia-gram”	is	never	actualized	and	there	is	nothing	that	makes	one	“diagram”	distinct	from	an-other	aside	from	the	part-to-whole	relations,	for	the	“diagram”	is	comprised	of	universal	sin-gularities	that	we	can	scale	up	or	down	as	we	see	fit	(i.e.,	from	the	small	local	bodega	to	the	transnational	circuits	of	 trade).	De	Landa’s	conception	of	 the	“diagram”	 is	a	stable	virtual	structure	and,	thus,	there	are	solely	sets	of	universal	singularities	that	(over)determine	all	possibilities.	This	 is	why,	 for	de	Landa,	 there	can	never	truly	be	bodies	without	organs—bodies	are	always	already	tethered	to	their	organs,	this	just	takes	some	measuring,	testing,	and	experimenting	to	reveal.	This	is	also	why	Kleinherenbrink	is	rather	justified	in	his	charge	that	de	Landa	conflates	epistemological	heuristics	for	ontological	realities,	inadvertently	re-introducing	a	“Platonic	heaven”	of	essences	through	the	ideally	continuous	cosmic	virtual	plane	that	breaks	into	segments,	despite	being	deprived	of	any	theory	of	identity	or	origina-tion.	As	Kleinherenbrink	notes:		 De	Landa	also	claims	 that,	 for	example,	hunter-gatherer	societies	always	already	con-tained	a	prefigured	state	in	their	possibility	space.	But	if	the	cosmic	plane	already	con-tains	all	possibilities	and	if	it	is	how	the	world	‘first’	begins,	then	why	did	everything	not	just	come	into	existence	from	the	get-go?	Or	why	in	this	order	and	not	in	another?	And	why	is	it	experiencing	itself	as	if	it	is	discrete	identities?	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	181)		Admittedly,	 de	 Landa’s	 assemblage	 posits	 a	 realism	 for	 all	 entities	 regardless	 of	type/scale,	grants	assemblages	an	initial	and	real	causal	efficacy,	roots	assemblages	in	his-torical	 production	 (rather	 than	 transcendent	 structures),	 retains	 that	 assemblages	 have	mind-independent	reality,	and	regards	human-object	relations	as	ontologically	equal	to	ob-ject-object	relations	(de	Landa	2016).	However,	in	order	to	avoid	conceiving	of	assemblages	
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as	illusory	perspectives	produced	by	and	located	on	an	intensive	virtual	realm	that	exists	in	a	wholly	unified	and	continuous	form,	which	is,	itself,	further	situated	within	a	supervenient	and	immanent	eternal	present,	we	must	rectify	our	externality	thesis.	This	is	what	differen-tial	heterogenesis	qua	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology	grants	us,	which	de	Landa’s	internalist	ontology	of	continuity	vide	the	assemblage	does	not.		
	
	
§	The	Differential	Further	Considered		Parallel	to	Sarti	and	Citti,	Simon	Duffy,	and	Anna	Longo	is	latticework	of	contemporary	“speculative	 realist”	 philosophers—including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 Bryant,	 Kleinherenbrink,	and	de	Landa—who	provide	 for	 the	arachnean	cast	of	Deleuze’s	differential	 shadow,	 the	fixture	of	which	prompts	imploring	Deleuze’s	oeuvre	between	functionalist	and	eliminativist	foundations,	or	materialist	and	rationalist	persuasions.	For	both	Bryant	and	de	Landa,	for	instance,	discrete	entities	are	designated	as	internal	to	larger	continuous	domains,	whereby	the	 virtual	 is	 relegated	 to	 purely	 productive	 forces—“chaos	 itself,	 or	 anything	 else”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	295).	We	might	add	to	this	motley	cast	of	post-Deleuzean	thinkers	David	 Lapoujade	 as	 well	 as	 neorationalists	 such	 as	 Ray	 Brassier	 and	 Reza	 Negarestani.	Lapoujade’s	rendering	of	Deleuze’s	aberrant	Bergsonianism	endeavors	to	couple	Deleuze’s	syntheses	with	memory	(e.g.,	“contraction-memory”	as	the	connective	first	synthesis,	which	is	 explained	 by	 "innumerable	 vibrations	 of	matter";	 “recollection-memory”	 alongside	 the	disjunctive	synthesis;	 “spirit-memory”	as	 the	vitalist	rumble	of	 the	conjunctive	 synthesis;	2018).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Negarestani’s	 turn	 towards	 transcendental	 computationalism,	emphasizing	sapience	and	the	logical	inference	of	language,	unwittingly	reveals	its	hidden	Deleuzian	 sympathies	 when	 describing	 anisotropic	 processes	 of	 collectivization	 and	depathologization	(as	 it	applies	 to	 the	environmentally	embedded	 individual	and	AGI).	 In	Ray	 Brassier’s	 Sellarsian	 scientific	 formulation,	 reality	 exists	 independently	 from	 human	experience	and/or	thought,	despite	it	can	be	grasped	through	the	application	of	privileged	procedures	 (if	 this	 is	 indicated	 by	 kenotypic	 signs-cum-mathematics	 for	 Quentin	Meillassoux,	for	Brassier	it	is	relegated	to	the	realm	of	natural	sciences).	Following	another	philosophical	 trail	 is	 Yuk	 Hui,	 who,	 as	 a	 student	 of	 Bernard	 Stiegler’s,	 has	 significantly	departed	 from	 Stiegler’s	 Derridean	 influence,	 striking	 a	 balance	 between	 Deleuze’s	“transcendental	 empiricism”,	 Leibniz’	 alignment	 of	 mathematics	 (with	 the	 mathematical	infinitesimal),	and	Schelling’s	description	of	nature	as	a	self-organizing	system,	adjudicating	a	tripartite	mold	of	speculation,	imagination,	and	integration.		Differential	Deleuzianism’s	“overflowing	becomings”	have	widespread	implications:	in	bi-ology,	it	points	us	towards	phylogenetic	evolutionary	pathways	and	autopoiesis	(Varela	&	Maturana	 1992);	 in	 semiotics,	 it	 directs	 us	 towards	 the	morphogenesis	 of	 being	 (Petitot	2004);	in	political	life,	it	illuminates	the	cyclic	emergence	of	insurrectional	technical	flows	as	
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supervening	upon	proletarianization	 (Stiegler	2019);	 for	new	media	 theory	and	software	studies,	the	differential	provides	us	with	a	point	of	entry	so	as	to	examine	newfound	incom-putable	infinities,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Halting	probability	problem	(Parisi	2013;	Fazi	2018).	In	philosophy	of	physics,	this	conception	of	the	differential	allows	us	to	examine	the	issue	of	multiscalar	analysis	in	modern	computational	modeling	techniques,	helping	us	rec-ognize	 the	distortions	and	vagaries	 in	 theory-as-approximation	 (i.e.,	 describing	materials	that	reveal	large	amounts	of	significant	structure	at	intermediate	size	scales;	Wilson	2018).	There	are,	indeed,	a	number	of	shared	(albeit	uniquely	stratified)	concerns	by	these	con-temporary	posthumanist	thinkers,	wherein	the	goal	of	recasting	aesthetic	questions	is	con-jured	by	the	frame	of	epistemology	while	knowledge	is	subsumed	under	the	category	of	spec-ulative	(and,	often,	non-human)	naturalism.9	Stiegler’s	conception	of	exteriorized	hypomne-mata	(media	mnemonics)	and	epiphylogenesis	(the	mutually	constitutive	relation	between	technics	and	organism)	is	circumscribed	to	the	exteriorized	interiority	of	the	individual	in	an	 anthropic	 framework	 (exosomatization).10	 Here,	 metastable	 distribution	 is	 lineally	fielded	across	nested	retentional	hierarchies	and	mereological	protentional	resonances—Stiegler	conceives	of	Deleuze’s	virtuality	as	the	point	of	singularity	(or	a	“minimum”)	through	a	manifold	series	of	metric	properties	that	unfold	historically.	Hui	orients	this	in	a	unique	direction,	by	demonstrating	how	Kant’s	Critique	of	Judgment	(1790)	is	the	first	philosophical	work	to	made	the	organism	explicit	and	paradigmatic	as,	for	Kant,	mechanical	laws	are	not	sufficient	to	explain	contingency	and	the	teleology	of	nature.	By	co-opting	Schelling’s	con-ception	of	freedom	as	the	improbable,	or	absolute	contingency,	Hui	recapitulates	nature	as	neither	something	inside	us	nor	outside	of	us	but,	instead,	as	it	actively	abolishes	subject-
                                               9		 We	will	try	to	show	how,	as	in	Negarestani’s	computational	transcendentalism,	this	“aesthetic	question”	is	inextricably	bound	 to	 the	conditions	of	perception,	whereby	 the	 tyranny	of	 scalar	optics	 is	existentially	determinate;	 thus,	 the	 “discrete”	 is	 an	 inflected	 ontological	 feature	 that	 recasts	 commitments	 to	 anti-materialism	upon	human	 finitude	 (recalling	Gödel’s	notion	of	absolute	 truth).	From	Carnap’s	predictive	interference	 learning	 machine	 to	 Solomonoff’s	 low-level	 optical	 feature	 detectors,	 Marcus	 Flutter’s	compression	of	general	intelligence,	and	Eliezer	Yudkowsky’s	Bayesian	program	of	rational	AGI,	inductivist	models	 of	 ampliative	 intelligence	 do	 not	 account	 for	 truth-preserving	 and	nondemonstrative	 inference.	Insisting	upon	the	fruits	of	the	human	experiential-cognitive	terrain	whereby,	irrespective	of	their	biases,	all	models	of	AGI	are	built	on	implicit	models	of	rationality,	Negarestani’s	project	is	to	upend	the	post-human	conception	that	extends	Humean	induction	to	AGI.	This	is	pursued	by	way	of	the	“geistig	intelligence”	of	“possible	 worlds”.	 Differential	 heterogenesis	 upholds	 the	 network-coherence	 of	 such	 non-linear	architectures,	which	understand	structure	minimally	via	 the	explanatory	 function	of	elements	and	 their	relations	(e.g.,	semantic	structures).	10		 By	“interiority”,	we	mean	what	Friedrich	Kittler	termed	the	“old	thesis”	of	media	theory,	which,	for	Kittler,	was	circumscribed	to	McLuhan	but	also	appears	in	André	Leroi-Gourhan’s	concept	of	“exosomatization”	and,	consequently,	in	Stiegler.	Kittler	rejected	this	notion	that	media	function	as	“extensions”	of	the	“human	senses”	or	as	“prostheses”	of	organs	(admittedly,	for	Leroi-Gourhan,	as	for	Derrida,	media	also	functioned	as	 archival	 tools	 for	 memory).	 Kittler	 vigorously	 refused	 this	 “old	 thesis”,	 which,	 according	 to	 him,	“amounted	to	saying,	in	the	beginning	was	the	body,	then	came	the	glasses,	then	suddenly	television,	the	computer”;	Kittler	preferred	a	more	interventive	relationship	between	media	and	organism,	whereby	“tools	establish	culture,	because	they	participate	in	the	rapport	existing	between	hand	and	brain”.	(Kittler	et	al.	1996:	738;	Kittler,	in	Ernst	Kapp	2018:	111).	
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object	dualism(s).	Hui	plucks	Schelling’s	system	to	proffer	recursivity	as	a	“self-contained	whole”	(Hui	2019:	55).	This	marks	the	philosophical	crux	of	organicism	as	a	foundation	for	thinking	 of	 an	 open	 system	 through	meta-scalar	 self-organization,	 anticipating	 biological	models	 such	 as	 Ilya	 Prigogine’s	 dissipative	 system	 and	 Francisco	 Varela	 and	 Humberto	Maturana’s	autopoiesis.	Schelling’s	philosophy	of	nature	also	informs	Hui’s	organismic	con-ception	of	spatiality,	where	each	organism	is	understood	as	“self-contained”	but	also	always	“influenced	by	other	organisms,	so	such	an	 ‘internal	 finality’	affirms	a	structural	 ‘external	finality’”	(163).	Through	Schelling,	Hui	destabilizes	the	conception	of	our	world	as	a	closed	and	static	material	system.11	Hui	has	recently	taken	interest	in	the	positive	use	of	the	Absolute	in	Meillassoux	as	artic-ulated	in	the	“inhuman”	as	an	“affirmation	of	a	nonhuman	way	of	production	of	knowledge	and	systematization”	through	reiteration,	with	this	reaching	towards	the	potential	of	infini-tude	(as	exemplified	by	mathematical	practice;	263).	For	Meillassoux,	the	kenotype	is	pure	identity	and	 indexes	 that	which	 is	outside	of	 the	 field	of	 sensible	 repetition.	Hui	demon-strates	how	Meillassoux’s	reiteration—the	ontology	of	empty	signs—in	fact	affirms	compu-tationalism.	Bolstered	by	Gödel,	Hui’s	conception	of	the	inhuman	attempts	to	transcend	sys-tematization,	rather	than	reaffirm	it,	with	contradiction	as	the	undecidable	rather	than	that	which	is	overcome	in	(historical-temporal)	reality.	It	is	with	the	looming	overhang	of	prefor-mation	that	the	inhuman	–Hui’s	cosmological	arrangement–finds	it	collective	closure	with	differential	heterogenesis’	abstract	morphologies	devoid	of	corporeal	value,	i.e.,	pure	salien-
cies	(Sarti	&	Barbieri	2018:	56).	If	Lautman’s	penetration	of	the	real	by	intelligence	diffused	differential	geometry	as	a	cos-mological	vector,	Jean	Petitot’s	philosophical	interest	in	mathematization	vis-à-vis	the	crit-ico-phenomenological	tradition	permits	us	to	go	beyond	a	biological	understanding	of	mor-phogenesis.	This	is	why	Sarti,	Citti,	and	Piotrowski,	contra	Saussure’s	initial	impulse	to	dis-miss	“the	sound”	as	“gnoseological	obstruction”,	recompose	phenomenology	into	the	becom-ing	 of	 meaning	 (Sarti	 et	 al.	 2019:	 15).	 Similarly,	 directing	 the	 real	 along	 mathematical	
                                               11	 If	Schelling’s	Naturphilosophie	is	a	precursor	to	biological	organicism,	for	Hui	it	is	Hegel’s	dialectical	logic	that	anticipates	the	machinic	organicism	of	cybernetics—second	order	cybernetics	to	be	specific.	Where	Hegel’s	 nature	 is	an	 object	 of	 observing	 reason	 from	 the	 outset,	 for	 Schelling	 nature	 is	 pre-consciously	sensed	and	detected	prior	to	becoming	an	object	of	reflection.	Unlike	Schelling’s	emphasis	on	an	external	force’s	giving	form	to	the	nature’s	production,	Hegel’s	departure	from	preformation	towards	immanent	neg-ativity	re-introduces	contingency	into	the	system	of	nature.	We	can	map	this	onto	second-order	cybernetics	quite	neatly	as,	 for	Hegel,	 there	are	two	forms	of	recursion:	1)	chaotic	nature	2)	the	logical	category	(of	being).	Hui	also	illuminates	the	recursive	relation	between	the	whole	and	the	reflective	judgment	through	the	subjective	speculative	process	of	reason.	This	“speculative	whole”	is	critical	to	Kant’s	central	methodol-ogy	and	directly	influenced	Georges	Canguilhem,	who	coined	the	term	“general	organology”.	Reading	Kant	as	a	philosopher	of	technology,	Canguilhem	conceives	of	intelligence	as	the	act	of	“geometrizing	matter”	that	recursively	constructs	its	artifactual	scaffolding,	stilted	on	“duration	and	extension”	(160).	Additionally,	is	through	Bergson’s	work	 on	 integrative	 evolution	 that	 Canguilhem’s	 “general	 organology”	 becomes	 that	which	infinitizes	the	finite	and	ecologically	reintegrates	the	inorganic	into	an	organized	whole—the	organic	is	irreducible	to	the	mechanical,	which	is	merely	a	particular	instantiation	of	the	organic.	
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morphogenesis,	Petitot’s	work	on	the	superimposition	of	receptive	fields	echoes	reconceives	of	the	differential	as	a	media	mnemonic	with	which	we	are	allowed	“to	test”	the	real	(1987:	20).	Petitot’s	most	recent	work	with	eigenvalues	uses	Alan	Turing’s	“reaction-diffusion	dif-ferential	equations”	to	parse	Newtonian	mechanics	alongside	kinetic	chemical	information;	according	to	Petitot,	scalar	sets	demystify	the	differential’s	ability	to	evoke	the	“breakdown	of	symmetry	and	homogeneity”	(2012:	22).	Petitot’s	writing	on	morphogenetic	substances	also	demonstrates	how	there	exist	many	homologies	of	organization	between	different	bio-logical	species	that	are	determined	along	histological	patterns,	fortifying	Sarti	and	Citti’s	Si-mondonian-biological	conception	of	organology-formation	qua	differential	heterogenesis.	Fielding	Sarti	and	Citti’s	terrain	of	becoming-differential	and	the	computational	linkages	between	 geometries,	 symmetries,	 and	 geodesics	 central	 to	 understanding	 the	 physical	world,	one	may	consider	Simondon’s	“intraperceptive	image”,	the	pre-condition	to	percep-tion,	 and	Deleuze’s	 “Aionic”	 temporality	 of	 the	 third	 synthesis	 of	 time.12	 Aside	 from	 self-touching	haptic	conceptions	of	 the	self,	such	differentials	are	also	 linked	to	self-reflective	mental	portraiture	on	the	“infraceptive”	scale,	or	that	which	is	sensuously	“seized	within”	(kinesthetic/proprioceptive),	where	the	fold	touches	upon	itself,	providing	the	differential	with	a	breakage	point	within	the	ubiquity	of	universality	such	that	it	can	locate	itself.	From	nano-technologies	to	the	subjective	experiences	that	emerge	out	of	the	differential,	such	link-ages	may	provide	an	imprint	of	experience	that	pertain	to	making	sense	out	of	what	were	once	regarded	as	provisional	“invariances”.13		
                                               12		 For	Deleuze,	the	Aion	is	the	continuous	tense	of	becoming,	pitted	against	the	Chronos	of	the	hegemonic	po-litical	order.	Thus,	while	this	paper	does	not	take	aim	at	the	political	insurgencies	of	the	differential,	this	could	be	a	viable	point	of	entry.	Nonetheless,	the	operational	logic	of	Deleuze’s	continuous	tense	of	becom-ing	is	recalled	in	Citti’s	recent	research	on	building	a	Poisson	kernel	that	starts	from	the	knowledge	of	a	smooth	fundamental	solution	so	as	to	contract	the	problem	of	“whole	space”	while	eliminating	any	use	of	the	Fourier	transform	in	the	full	rank	case	(Baldi	et	al.	2019).	13		 For	Robert	Nozick,	consciousness	functions	as	a	sort	of	“zoom	lens"	with	which	an	organism	can	attune	its	behavior	with	its	environment	(Nozick	2003:	180-190).	Such	“zooming(s)”	supplements	Deleuze’s	“passive	synthesis”	qua	Simondon’s	unconscious	process	of	becoming-produced	through	multi-generational	assem-blages	and	circuits,	facilitating	transindividuation	(which	is	societal	and	intergenerational).	According	to	Stiegler	and	Yuk	Hui,	who	build	on	such	a	conception	of	synthesis,	media	objects	supplement	transindivid-ual	memory	with	 “invariance”	 (and,	 according	 to	Hui’s	 cosmotechnics,	 “human	 freedom”)	 as	 it	 transits	across	generational	attenuation,	engaging	within	the	cross-generational	social	sphere	of	non-verbal/non-graspable	recursive	encoding	(to	accomplish	this,	Hui	recalls	Gödel’s	criticism	of	materialism;	Hui	2019:	236).	Musing	on	the	non-graspable,	one	may	consider	Thomas	Nagel’s	oft-quoted	paper	on	“bat	conscious-ness”,	which	asserts	subjectivity’s	ambient	spectral	vagaries	of	“unknowingness”,	where	simply	knowing	a	theory	doesn’t	make	the	theory	true	of	or	for	the	knower.	Nagel’s	epiphenomenalist	argument	asserts	that,	no	matter	how	well	we	describe	 the	bat’s	use	of	echolocation	extrinsically/informationally,	we	are	still	barred	access	from	“the	notion	of	what	it	is	like	to	be	a	bat”	(Nagel	1974:	438;	emphasis	added).	In	response,	Paul	Churchland	notes	that	“[t]he	proper	test	of	that	scientific/physical/objective	theory	of	bat-style	cogni-tion	is	whether,	when	that	theory	happens	to	be	genuinely	true	of	some	given	creature,	then	the	creature	actually	has	the	subjective	experiences	of	a	bat”	(2011:	19).	Churchland’s	criticism	of	Nagel’s	use	of	“quali-tative	simples”	 is	that	it	confounds	what	it	 is	to	know	something	with	what	it	 is	to	actually	be	something	(ontology),	such	that	this	problem	is	one	of	translation.	Bringing	this	back	to	Hui’s	idealism,	one	may	say	that	the	“positive	inhuman”	is	only	out	of	comprehensive	reach	insofar	as	it	is	not	translated	properly.	
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Anisotropic	Materials	&	Multi-Scalar	Media	Modeling			The	infinitesimal	is	not	simply	a	topological	question	of	division	in	Euclidean	space,	per-ception,	and	observation	but,	as	Sarti	and	Citti	note,	concerns	how	neurogeometries—such	as	Petitot’s	sub-Riemannian	geometry—	demonstrate	“differential	constraints”	that	are	not	necessarily	 deduced	 from	 more	 sophisticated	 structures	 (2019:	 11).14	 Just	 as	 semantic	meaning	is	always	produced	as	a	pragmatic	experimentation	of	singular	transformation	but	never	given,	differential	neurogeometry	enumerates	how	a	mathematical	description	for	the	emergence	and	creation	of	conditional	forms	is	not	configured	as	an	a	priori	given	within	a	set	(Sauvagnargues	2018:	17).	Petitot’s	work	on	vision	and	image	processing,	which	builds	upon	David	Mumford's	geometrical	formatting	of	visual	input,	exhibits	how	neurogeometry	testifies	that	“phase	space”	is	a	“pure	intuition”	that	is	non-conceptual,	antepredicative,	and	a	prejudicative.	Homologous	to	how	Sarti	and	Citti’s	differential	heterogenesis	provides	us	with	a	mathematical	description	of	the	dynamic	production	of	a	priori	“phase	space”,	neuro-geometries	are	specified	by	a	cognitive	corollary	to	virtual-actual	becoming,	where	the	key	role	is	that	of	scale:		 Perceptual	geometry	results	from	the	integration	of	local	detections	by	receptive	fields	which	have	a	certain	width	and	so	occurs	at	a	certain	scale,	i.e.	with	a	certain	resolution.	Perceptual	differential	geometry	must	therefore	be	multiscale,	while	conventional	dif-ferential	geometry	corresponds	to	the	idealization	of	infinite	resolution.	(Petitot	2008:	13;	emphasis	added)		To	best	articulate	this	problem,	let	us	take	into	consideration	a	simple	steel	beam.	At	the	highest	 size	 scales—following	 Hookean	 first-order	 linear	 approximation—steel	 stretches	and	compresses	down	to	approximately	10μm.	At	10μm,	the	grain	structure	within	steel	be-comes	highly	pertinent,	as	these	grain	structures	and	their	components	begin	to	stretch	and	compress	according	to	a	more	complex	set	of	rules	than	larger-scale	steel.	Within	each	of	these	component	grains	there	are	a	number	of	“laminate	layers	which	rub	against	one	an-other	in	complicated	ways	[….]	until	we	reach	the	tiny	crystal	lattices	of	the	molecular	level,	whose	 orderly	patterns	 are	 interrupted	 by	 higher-scale-irregularities	 called	 dislocations”	(Wilson	2018:	202-203).	 It	 is	here	 that	 the	differential	 equations	 that	 regulate	behaviors	nominally	occurring	in	the	“infinitesimal”	level	become	central.	The	specifications	relevant	for	the	differential	equations	within	physics	are	generally	obtained	by	scaling	higher-level	behaviors	downwards,	until	some	simpler	 infinitesimal	 level	 is	reached.15	Steel,	however,	presents	a	problem	to	such	benchmark	scaling	assumptions,	as	its	behaviours	stop	scaling	at	
                                               14		 The	illusory	contours	of	sub-Riemannian	geometry,	defined	along	planar	curves,	demonstrates	how	spatial	representations	have	neural	origins	related	to	wavelet	analysis	and	are	immanent	to	visual	perception	(Pet-itot	2017:	304).	15		 This	is	well	codified	by	the	apothegm	that	“physics	is	simpler	in	the	small”.	
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the	cutoff	of	~10μm.	While	small	sections	of	steel	behave	more	or	less	identically	at	all	scale	lengths	above	this	level,	to	capture	the	component	grain	behaviours	after	10μm	accurately,	we	are	required	to	model	it	in	a	more	laminate-based	manner.		What,	exactly,	then	is	the	“greediness	of	scales”?	While	Representative	Volume	Element	(RVE)16	sub-models	can	be	examined	on	account	of	contemporary	scientific	observational-measurement	 tools	 (and,	 in	 particular,	 advances	 in	 computer	 simulation	 that	 attempt	 to	overcome	descriptive	clashes),	it	is	the	problem	of	data	amalgamation	that	prevents	“prac-titioners	 from	profiting	 from	this	collective	knowledge	 in	a	straightforward	way”	(203)17.	This	 is	 because,	 using	 RVE	 scale-focused	modelling	 via	 differential	 equations	 in	 bottom-down	fashion	(i.e.,	reaching	towards	the	infinitesimal),	amalgamation	presents	a	conflict	re-garding	the	direct	descriptive	incompatibilities	that	arise	when	we	use	the	same	vocabulary	with	respects	to	properties	that	a	material	(such	as	steel)	displays	on	small-scale	levels.18	The	“greediness	of	scales”	summons	the	central	concerns	of	differential	heterogenesis,	producing	a	collective	closure	between	the	semantic	and	the	topological	concerns	that	Sarti	and	Citti	elude	to.	The	central	problem	arises	on	the	differential	terrain:	differential	equa-tions	that	are	appropriate	to	two	levels	of	sub-modelling	necessitate	that	the	narrowly-con-strained	rules	concerning	stretching	and	compression	must	remain	applicable	down	to	the	
zero-length	scale.	Hence,	the	“greediness	of	scales”	conflict	is	born	due	to	syntactic	dishar-mony:	the	differential	equation	model	must	account	for	all	the	lower-size	scales	available	to	reach	the	infinitesimal	level,	which	is	where	differential	equations	articulate	their	stipula-tions.	However,	due	to	the	syntactical	discordance	concerning	the	material’s	behaviour	be-yond	a	cutoff	level,	we	have	to	content	with	inconsistent	claims	concerning	the	very	same	part	of	a	material,	media,	or	object.	This	may	remind	the	reader	of	Sellars’	“pink	cube”	prob-lem,	where	an	ice	cube’s	colour	is	observed	as	ultimately	homogenous	because	its	“manifest	image”	presents	itself	to	us	as	a	“pink	continuum”	in	“all	the	regions	of	which,	however	small,	are	pink”	(Sellars	1966:	26).	The	concept	of	“pink”,	however,	demands	that	its	applications	
scale	continuously	downwards	to	the	infinitesimal	level,	wherein	this	“manifest	image”,	or	the	image	of	as	it	is	plainly	conceived	of	to	the	naked	eye,	is	set	in	contrast	to	what	we	know	through	scientific	measurement	or,	in	Sellars’	parlance,	“the	scientific	image”.	Despite	Wilson	
                                               16		 Representative	Volume	Element	(RVE)	denotes	the	descriptive	depiction	linked	to	a	set	of	target-events	in	terms	of	the	characteristic	size-scale	of	an	object	during	which	those	events	unfold.		17		 This	means	that	two	scientists	who	model	different	select	scale	levels	(of	steel)	can	not	simply	posit	their	combined	research	results	because	it	will	result	in	syntactic	inconsistencies	where	differential	equation	re-quirements	overlap.	18		 With	crystalline	materials,	for	example,	at	low-level	scales	we	observe	segments	of	perfect	lattice	configura-tions	bonded	together	around	arbitrarily	oriented	boundaries.	At	scale	levels	above	this	point	(10μm),	RVE	behaviours	around	the	level	of	conglomerations	are	generally	isotropic	(the	material	responds	to	the	same	rules	 regardless	of	which	direction	 it	 is	being	pulled).	Higher-scale	 responses	support	modelling	where	compression	and	stretching	behaviours	are	governed	by	Young’s	modulus	of	elasticity	(E	or	Y)	with	the	shear	modulus	0μm;	however	the	small	slivers	of	crystal	within	these	conglomerates	do	not	stretch	and	
compress	in	this	simple	manner.	Thus,	RVE	modellings	“appropriate	to	these	tiny	structures	require	five	or	six	elastic	modalities	to	capture	their	anisotropic	behaviors”	(Wilson:	203;	emphasis	added).	
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is	concerned	with	continuum	physics	and	the	stipulations	behind	a	scale’s	executing	a	bot-tom-down	monopoly—specifically	as	it	concerns	requirements	of	mass	and	stress—there	is	a	homology	here	with	Sellars’	“clash	between	images”.19	Engineer	J.T.	Oden	has	described	this	tyranny	of	scales	problem	by	remarking	that	all	sim-ulation	methods	produced	until	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century	were	valid	solely	for:		 [L]imited	ranges	of	spatial	and	temporal	scales.	Those	conventional	methods,	however,	cannot	cope	with	physical	phenomena	operating	across	large	ranges	of	scale—12	orders	of	magnitude	in	time	scales,	such	as	in	the	modelling	of	protein	folding	or	10	orders	of	magnitude	in	spatial	scales,	such	as	in	the	design	of	advanced	materials.	At	those	ranges,	the	power	of	the	tyranny	of	scales	renders	useless	virtually	all	conventional	methods.	(Oden	2006:	§3.1)		As	 eluded	 to	 earlier,	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	we	 have	 developed	 advanced	modelling	schemes	to	resolve	such	discrepancies	by	allowing	RVE	sub-modelling	layers	to	circumscribe	their	descriptive	agenda	to	localized	and	semi-autonomous	“strata”,	or	what	Robert	Batter-man	 (co-opting	 the	 term	 from	 physicist	 Robert	 Laughlin)	 calls	 a	 “protectorate”.20	 These	semi-enclosed	strata/protectorates	are	set	into	communication	with	one-another	through	those	 “coded	messages”	 called	 homogenizations,	 dividing	 linguistic	 labour	 and	moulding	novel	 explanatory	architecture.	Such	a	homogenization	policy	shows	an	 internally	 linked	equilibrium	by	aping	the	physical	manner	in	which	“relatively	simple	forms	of	dominating	behaviour,	characterized	by	a	limited	set	of	descriptive	parameters,	emerge	at	higher	scales	from	their	large,	lower-scale	underpinning”	(Wilson	2018:	219).	Differential	heterogenesis	can,	thus,	be	used	as	a	technical	tool	to	produce	equilibrium	homogeneity.		Given	the	standard	tools	of	Euclidean	geometry,	there	are	considerable	difficulties	in	cap-turing	the	“natural”	notion	of	a	dominant	behaviour	in	precise	terms	that	we	have	attempted	to	counteract.	What	of	the	semantic	terrain?	Like	syntactical	structure,	the	topological	charge	of	any	gradient	field	is	a	problem	of	scales,	but	in	both	examples	a	crucial	consideration	is	
                                               19		 For	Sellars,	this	“relocation	story”	is	not	“simply	a	solution	to	the	problem	posed	by	mathematical	physics.	It	is	also	an	account	of	how	we	could	come	to	be	able	to	think	about	sense	impressions	in	the	first	place.	We	come	to	be	able	to	think	about	sense-impressions	of	pink	cubes	by	first	thinking	about	volumes	of	pink	that	we	seem	to	see,	and	then	recasting	the	manifest	pinkness	as	properties	of	perceptual	states	of	ourselves”	(Rosenthal	2016:	153).	Sellars’	relocation	picture	necessitates	that	we	conceive	of	sense-impressions	as	automatically	conscious,	whereby	mental	states’	being	conscious	is	distinct	from	the	individual’s	being	con-scious.	For	Sellars,	the	central	question	of	the	“grain	problem”	was	whether	it	could,	in	principle,	be	possible	without	a	neurophysiological	conceptual	framework	that	defines	states	according	to	intrinsic	character	but	proffers	to	epiphenomena.	Wilson,	on	the	other	hand,	is	not	interested	in	the	homogeneity	constraints	sat-isfied	by	conscious	presentational	content	but	syntactical	overdetermination.	20		 “The	crystalline	state	is	the	simplest	known	example	of	a	quantum	protectorate,	a	stable	state	of	matter	whose	generic	 low-energy	properties	are	determined	by	a	higher	organizing	principle	and	nothing	else”	(Laughlin	&	Pines	2000:	29).	The	“protectorate”	is	a	domain	of	physics	where	behaviour	is	independent	of	the	microdetails	found	at	small	size	scales	(Batterman	2010).		
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the	problem	of	modelling.	As	elaborated	in	“the	greediness	of	scales”	problem,	scale-focused	modelling	must	utilize	differential	equations	while	contending	with	the	descriptive	demands	of	reaching	down	to	the	infinitesimal	level.	A	differential	equation	model	must	monopolize	all	of	the	lower-size	scales	available	to	reach	the	infinitesimal	level	at	which	these	equations	articulate	 their	 stipulations.	 This	 description	of	 differential	 equations	 gets	 to	 the	 core	 of	Deleuzian	heterogeneity	and	the	difficultly	of	applying	an	ontology	to	amalgamation.21	In-stead,	we	need	a	hybrid	category	that	articulates	the	compossibility	of	passive	synthesis	(mi-crostates	and	their	microeffects)	and	differential	retention	(mnemonic	integration	and	re-distribution).	Wilson’s	project,	broadly	speaking,	outlines	the	working	architectures	of	modern	multi-scalar	modelling	techniques	to	help	us	recognize	the	distortions	and	vagaries	in	“Theory	T	thinking”,	or	theory-as-approximation.	Moving	forward,	we	will	focus	upon	the	difficulties	involved	in	describing	materials	that	reveal	large	amounts	of	significant	structure	at	inter-mediate	size-scales	(e.g.,	the	structural	features	that	distinguish	one	igneous	rock	from	an-other,	or	the	out-of-equilibrium	formations	that	blacksmiths	fold	and	beat	into	steels).	Con-sider,	for	instance,	the	diamond’s	long-lasting	range	of	“frozen	order”,	wherein	there	exist	strong	energetic	barriers	within	the	diamond	that	prevent	it	from	returning	to	low-pressure	graphite,	such	that	it	has	a	long	relaxation	time.	Similarly,	most	solid	materials	display	very	little	inclination	for	maximizing	their	entropies.		If	cognitive	architecture	involves	tacit	adjustments	in	contextual	registers,	what	does	this	mean	for	the	representational	structure	of	the	syntactic	demands	in	question?	Sarti	and	Citti	give	us	an	answer	concerning	the	co-constitution	of	assembly	via	meaning	and	sensibility,	but	we	very	well	might	consider	another	approach,	beginning	with	the	question	of	compres-sive	schemas.	Let	us	take	the	example	of	two	standard	pictorial	modes—TIFF	and	JPEG	for-mats—wherein	the	JPEG	image	is	comprised	of	far	less	data-points	than	the	TIFF	image.	With	the	TIFF	image,	we	see	that	data	is	encoded	on	a	pixel-by-pixel	basis	(with	each	pixel	encoded	independently	of	one	another).	In	the	JPEG	image,	every	pixel’s	front-end	registration	gov-erns	a	 fixed	span	of	back-end	determinacy,	as	if	 the	 individual	pixels	of	 the	TIFF	had	dis-solved,	forming	an	assemblage	based	on	large-scale	(colour-determinate)	hierarchies.	Pars-ing	the	mold	of	the	JPEG	image’s	compressive	scheme,	we	can	construct	an	enactive	scaffold-ing	by	exploiting	contextual	registers;	this	begin	with	a	broad	metric,	Q1,	followed	up	by	finer	grained	metrics,	 Q2,	which	 rely	 upon	 the	 response	 to	Q1.	 This	 process	 follows	 through	 a	nested	array	of	further	queries,	Q3,	Q4,	and	so	on.	Such	interdependencies	unfold	within	a	segregated	front-end	register	(Q1,	Q2,	Q3,..),	followed	by	an	enumeration	on	their	respective	
                                               21	 This	has	traditionally	been	framed	by	mathematicians	such	as	Errico	Presutti	so	as	to	inadvertently	prod	the	problem	into	the	realm	of	epistemological	constraints	by	focusing	on	the	phenomenology	of	percep-tion/awareness,	suggesting	that	the	hierarchies	that	emerge	in	characteristic	scales	reflects	epistemic	lim-itations	regarding	our	representational	capacities.	Wilson	rejects	this	by	stressing	“the	direct	correspond-ence	of	dominant	behaviours	to	objective	issues	of	energetic	transfer	and	degradation”,	thus	making	this	an	ontological	issue	concerning	Quinean	commitments	(Wilson	2018:	213).	
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answers	(A1,	A2,	A3,..).	These	representational	tactics	are	termed	multiple	register	schemes,	where	syntactic	complexity	is	reduced	through	scope	restrictions	via	policies	of	contextual	localization.		Thus,	Wilson	 remarks	 that	 “[p]resent-day	 philosophy	 of	 language	 could	 become	more	supple	if	its	practitioners	more	warmly	appreciated	the	substantive	reductions	in	syntactic	complexity	achievable	through	various	policies	of	contextual	localization”	(9).	A	conception	of	computational	pragmatics	as	such	is	privy	to	responses	to	the	registrations	of	linguistic	capacities	with	respect	to	data	and	reasoning	qua	compression.		The	“greediness	of	scales”	problem	demonstrates	that	hysteresis,	the	microscopic	migra-tion	of	dislocations	that	eventually	results	 in	material	cracks	(i.e.,	 lower-scale	damage	 in-flicted	by	upper-scale	punishment),	can	not	be	illustrated	with	conventional	computational	modelling	through	single-level	descriptive	methods.	While	we	cannot	give	an	account	of	hys-teresis	by	working	upwards	from	the	molecular	scale	in	this	mode,	the	multi-scalar	model	evades	such	computational	barriers	by	enforcing	a	cooperative	division	of	descriptive	labour	amongst	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 RVE-centred	 sub-models,	 each	 of	which	 is	 tasked	with	 capturing	dominant	behaviours	that	arise	within	its	purview.	Thus	and	so,	“each	local	RVE	sub-model	directly	responds	only	to	its	local	environment,	rather	than	to	events	that	arise	within	distant	sectors	or	upon	alternative	size	scales”	(Wilson	2018:	222);	by	stepping	through	the	mathe-matical	filter	of	homogenization,	we	readjust	local	parameters	within	each	RVE	unit	until	the	cascade	of	inter-scalar	reports	is	rendered	self-consistent.	Wilson’s	adaptive	approach	also	emphasizes	how	the	use	of	“wandering	words”	such	as	“force”	or	“use”	precede	firm	referential	semantics;	only	after	applicational	enclosures	are	set	 can	 they	attach	 to	moorings	 suited	 for	novel	modelling	environments	 (Wilson	2006).	Thus,	Wilson	does	not	agree	with	Jerry	Fodor’s	anti-pragmatic	approach	to	meaning	(Fodor’s	
a	priori	assurance	suppresses	adaptive	behaviours	by	compounding	variegated	facets	of	lan-guage-learning).	Fodor	and	fellow	anti-pragmatists	such	as	Susan	Stebbing	argue	that	se-mantic	 scenarios	 inherently	 anticipate	 altered	 adjustments,	 claiming	 that	 terms	 such	 as	“force”	are	“first	assigned,	strong,	referentially	determinate	core	meanings	before	the	prag-matic	influences	of	applicational	context	can	begin	their	work”	(Wilson	2018:	30).		Terms	such	as	“force”,	“temperature”,	or	“cause”	are	granted	enlarged	descriptive	utilities	and,	 therefore,	 coherence	 strategies	 when	 they	 are	 developed	 within	 local	 adaptations,	whereby	such	arrangements	are	protected	by	“homogenization	barriers”.	Within	the	mul-tiscale	model,	structural	portioning	into	segregated	patching	abets	swift	processes	of	adap-tion—“[t]he	homogenization	barriers	that	block	direct	cross-scalar	syntactic	amalgamation	in	a	multiscalar	scheme	serve	as	essential	ingredients	within	the	remarkable	descriptive	ef-ficiencies	they	offer”	(Wilson	2018:	195).	It	is	precisely	the	“ready	reprogrammability”	of	any	multiple-register	language’s	format	that	facilitates	the	adaptive	plasticity	of	its	conceptual	practice.	Thus,	the	descriptive	focus	of	terms	such	as	“force”,	“temperature”,	“strain	energy”,	
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etc.	is	contingent	upon	scale-level	application,	where	“arrangements	facilitate	the	reassign-
ment	of	old	computational	routines	to	novel	applicational	purposes”	(30;	emphasis	added).22	
	
	
Deleuze	and	Scales		According	to	Deleuze,	 the	assemblage	has	“only	 itself,	 in	connection	with	other	assem-blages	and	in	relation	to	other	bodies	without	organs”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1983:	4).	De-spite	the	relations	that	any	media	object	may	have	with	its	semblance,	for	instance,	these	relations	are	demanded	by	externality	and	no	such	connections	to	other	entities	fully	desig-nate	its	“being”.	This	is	a	theme	that	we	may	term	poetically	term	“solitude”,	which	becomes	pellucid	in	Deleuze’s	books	on	cinema—such	“solicitude”	is	manifest	when	we	consider	the	structuration	of	cinematic	moving	images.	In	the	“movement-image”,	or	the	pre-World	War	II	cinematic	image,	“vehicles	or	moving	bodies”	are	understood	as	thoroughly	relational—that	is,	they	include	actions,	perceptions,	and	affections	that	hint	at	externality	(or	autonomy	and	materiality)	but	do	not	embrace	it	fully	(Deleuze	1986:	23).	In	the	works	of	Hitchcock,	for	example,	Deleuze	recognizes	that	relations	are	always	designated	along	external	terms	that	constantly	refuse	their	full	implication.	In	the	post-war	“time-image”,	we	see	the	envel-oping	of	incompatible	images,	disjunct	sounds,	and,	consequently,	incompossible	worlds	that	are—through	editing—brought	in-common,	suggesting	the	possibly	of	“an	outside	more	dis-tant	than	an	exterior,	and	that	of	an	inside	deeper	than	any	interior”	(Deleuze	1989;	Klein-herenbrink	 2019:	 54).	 It	 is	 this	 very	 incommensurability,	 the	 inextricable	 Outside	 from	which	emerges	cinematic	malaise,	that	we	see	inaugurated	the	possibility	of	the	impossible,	the	“false	image”	which	makes	manifest	a	“private	reality”	or	the	“virtuality	of	time”	(Gallo-way	2016:	68).	In	Deleuze’s	work	on	cinema,	the	screen’s	moving	images	are	but	metonyms	for	exocentric	frames	of	visual	reference,	evincing	that	perception,	which	is	indivisible,	offers	time	in	a	“pure	state”	(Deleuze	1983:	21;	Deleuze	2005:	96).23		
                                               22		 There	is	a	curious	parallel	between	Wilson’s	cyclic	description	of	our	regenerative	linguistic	formulations,	“condemned	to	wobble	between	seasons	of	brash	inferential	extension	and	epochs	of	qualified	retrench-ment	later	on”	and	André	Leroi-Gourhan’s	notion	of	the	evolutional	chaîne	opératoire	(Wilson	2018:	32).	According	to	Leroi-Gourhan,	“[f]or	each	species	a	cycle	is	established	between	its	technical	ability	(its	body)	and	its	ability	to	organize	itself	(its	brain).	Within	this	cycle,	through	economy	of	design,	a	way	opens	up	toward	increasingly	pertinent	selective	adaptation”	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993:	60).		23		 Thus,	the	differential	can	also	be	identified	with	the	process	of	watching	cinema,	whereby	Bergson’s	élan	
vital	is	reproduced	during	a	medial	becoming	that,	phenomenologically,	cannot	be	infinitely	divided	or	re-garded	as	an	aggregation;	a	“differential	difference”	emerges	between	the	temporality	inscribed	on	a	film	reel	(the	material	artefact	of	recorded	time)	and	its	perceptual	undertaking.	For	Deleuze,	perception’s	sche-matic	hold	foments	the	central	category	with	which	to	understanding	moving	images,	not	as	a	representa-tion	but	as	an	epiphenomenal	account	of	time	understood	in	the	manner	of	Bergson’s	conception	of	(pure)	duration.	As	we	see	in	Deleuze’s	Bergsonian	account	of	cinema,	moving	images	are	not	“images	of	move-ment”	or	“images	of	any	thing,	object,	or	model”	but,	instead,	“movement-images	grasped	as	blocks	of	sen-sation	that	free	the	image	from	its	dependence	on	the	archetype	or	the	eternal	pose”	(Baumbach	2018:	133).	In	Difference	 and	 Repetition,	 Cinema	 1:	 The	 Movement	 Image,	 and	 Cinema	 2:	 The	 Time-Image,	 Deleuze	
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This	inextricable	Outside,	as	a	functor	of	the	externality	thesis,	transpires	most	markedly	in	observations	from	lived	experience,	where	the	relation	of	signs-to-denotata	is	processed	through	 the	 “sensory	motor	 schema”	 as	 something	 akin	 to	 the	 causally-connected	 filmic	script	of	the	movement-image,	or	“cine-thinking”	(Alliez	2000).	To	inscribe	this	lesson	once	more,	we	can	 turn	 to	 those	examples	 in	visual	 art	 that	 actively	 engage	with	 the	plane	of	presentation	and	exigent	construction	as,	for	example,	in	Marcel	Duchamp’s	“Fountain”	read-ymade,	which:		does	not	need	its	‘R.	Mutt’	signature	in	order	to	exist,	nor	does	L.H/O.O.Q.	need	the	moustache	added	to	Mona	Lisa.	The	parts	of	an	entity	are	always	somewhat	redundant,	a	complex	notion	[...,	which]	reveal(s)	that	objects	have	no	natural	place,	function,	or	meaning.	There	is	nothing	external	consti-tuting	their	essence.	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	57)		What	does	this	have	to	do	with	multi-scalar	modelling?	Deleuze’s	overall	theory	of	ma-chines	is	fundamentally	flat,	discontinuous,	and	infrastructural,	as	Deleuzean	externality	is	premised	 upon	 irreducibility.	 Similarly,	 Wilson	 demonstrates	 the	 tyranny	 of	 reduction,	whether	it	be	an	ontology	(“Theory	T	thinking”),	modelling	(the	hyperbolic	notions	of	evolu-tionary	modelling),	or	semantics	(the	inferential	expectations	moored	to	words	like	“cause”).	In	 opposition	 to	 Platonism,	or	 internalism—which	 results	 from	 the	 private	 depth	 of	ma-chines	being	irreducible	to	and	unique	in	kind	from	their	actualizations—our	fundamental	error	of	 thinking,	 according	 to	Deleuze,	 is	 to	 conflate	 the	 contiguity,	 identity,	 and	 resem-blance	 characterizing	 actuality	 as	 also	 characterizing	 “things-in-themselves”.	 Therefore,	“every	entity	is	itself	a	machine,	in	the	sense	of	being	a	causally	effective	agent	that	makes	its	own	difference	in	the	world”	where	each	entity	has	its	own	unique	“complex	inner	working”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	7).	For	Deleuze,	machines	can	have	actualizations	that	are	not	themselves	machines	but	in-stead	translations	or	scalar	measurements	of	 the	being	of	a	machine	 into	the	experiential	content	of	another	machine.	Consider,	for	instance,	how	Duchamp’s	readymade	teaches	us	that	entities	are	obstinate	assemblages	and	that	all	entities	are,	consequently,	 irreducible	machines	that	can	function	smoothly	with	others	(if	the	proper	operations	are	exacted).	That	is,	the	“natural	condition”,	which	is	pre-observational,	is	that	of	the	straited	space;	it	is	the	necessity	 imposition	 of	 a	 scientific	 system	 and/or	 systematic	 scale/measurement	 that	mends	any	and	all	aforementioned	entities	together	within	scientific	unity.	Nonetheless,	this	irreducibility	 does	 not	 necessitate	 an	 ultimate	 hierarchy	or	 end-point—for	were	 this	 the	case,	all	entities	would	be	self-identical	and,	thus,	reducible	to	themselves.	Deleuze’s	ecology	of	the	assemblage,	a	synonym	for	“machine”,	designates	how	any	system	emerges	from	rela-tions	between	heterogenous	parts.	Deleuze’s	world	of	externality	is	one	in	which	“no	two	
                                               instates	Bergson’s	account	of	“emotion”,	which	configures	the	central	logic	of	Deleuze’s	differential	aesthet-ics	of	representation.	Deleuze’s	differential	aesthetics	develops	an	image	of	thought	that	attempts	to	over-come	the	binary	separation	between	matter	and	spirit,	or	mind	and	body.	
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grains	of	dust	are	absolutely	identical,	no	two	hands	have	the	same	distinctive	points,	no	two	typewriters	have	the	same	strike,	no	two	revolvers	score	their	bullets	in	the	same	manner”	(Deleuze	1994:	26).	This	absolute	refusal	of	internality	necessitates	that	there	be	no	princi-ple	frontier	of	passage	between	universal	and	particulars	(Deleuze	1990:	132).	This	also	ne-cessitates	that	there	be	a	difference	in	kind	between	metaphysical	surfaces	and	physical	sur-faces	of	each	entity,	such	that	all	entities	are	spatially,	temporally,	and	mereologically	irre-ducible.	Therefore,	primary	and	secondary	qualities,	parts,	functions,	wholes,	and	predicates	are	brought	into	an	ecology	of	relational	aspect-hood,	which	always	implies	other	entities’	necessity.	As	Sarti	and	Barbieri	comment	on	sensory	cortices’	receptive	profiles,	signification	pro-cesses	are	grouped	by	conditioning	and	reinforced	value	systems,	hereby	holding	a	candle	to	how	we	articulate	the	progressive	construction	between	seeing,	feeling,	knowing,	and	sig-nifying	as	the	relational	capture	of	elastic	moduli.	Similarly,	as	seen	in	the	corrective	process	of	 homogenization—neither	 purely	 bottom-up	nor	 top-down	 in	 its	descriptive	 policies—multiscalar	modelling	commits	to	running	through	successive	stages	(macroscopic	estima-tionàmicroscopic	 correction)	 as	 needed	 until	 an	 overall	 descriptive	 accord	 is	 reached.	Bringing	Wilson’s	description	of	scalar	overdetermination	together	with	Deleuze’s	demon-strates	 that	 the	 simple	 descriptive	modelling	assignment	 of	 “togetherness”	 is	 insufficient	when	relying	on	empirical	observation,	i.e.,	when	describing	generative	disharmony	at	the	level	of	the	differential.		
	
	
Conclusion:	Our	Place	in	the	World		How	does	Deleuze’s	thought	concern	the	human,	which	it	would	evidently	appear	to	never	privilege	beyond	the	machinic	“greediness	of	scales”	and	conjunctive	synthesis?	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology	accords	a	method	of	transcendental	empiricism.	This	system	begins	with	a	recollection	of	the	Kantian	“boundary	concept”	of	rationality’s	regulative	use;	according	to	Deleuze’s	account	of	“empiricism”,	human	finitude	designates	encounters	as	a	sign	or	mani-festation	of	other	entities	and	not	such	entities	in	and	of	themselves.	The	“transcendental”	portion	is	what	allows	us	to	assume	that	there	is	also	a	virtual	side	to	machines,	which	can	allow	us	to	move	beyond	the	pretention	of	negative	use.	In	his	early	account	of	“transcen-dental	empiricism”,	Deleuze’s	materialist	transvaluation	of	the	Kantian	account	of	transcen-dental	subjectivity	imparts	how	impersonal,	inhuman	thinking	does	not	merely	represent	the	natural	world	but	is	directly	productive	of	forms	(e.g.,	space	and	time).	Distinguishing	reiterative	subtraction	vis-à-vis	the	body	qua	belonging	from	the	formula	of	the	dialectic,	in	an	early	essay	concerning	Difference	and	Repetition,	my	mentor	Reza	Negarestani	notes	that	ontology	 is	“ultimately	a	differential	between	these	two	forms	of	cruelty”,	 i.e.	binding	the	living	to	the	dead,	or	sadism,	and	mandating	reconsummation,	or	masochism,	“with	the	void,	
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each	with	its	own	mechanisms	of	torture,	atrocious	creativities,	rules	and	problems”	(Negar-estani	2009:	78).	However,	as	Deleuze’s	system	matures,	 it	 further	accounts	 for	a	supple-mentary	 account	 of	 subjectification,	 wherein	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 “encounter”	 ensures	 the	“measure	of	fit”	between	transcendental	empiricism	as	a	constructivist	mathematism	of	con-cepts	and	the	world	of	intensive,	actual	difference.	Deleuze’s	transcendental	empiricism	of	inscribed	difference	thus	offers	a	positive	value,	rather	than	abiding	by	the	earlier	“law	of	the	negative”,	or	“negative	determination	of	the	body	qua	belonging	which	is	imposed	by	the	Ideal”	(Negarestani	2009:	78-79).	It	frees	dif-ference	from	its	(historical)	subordination	to	the	indeterminate	homogeneity	of	the	Platonic	composition	of	identity,	whereby	the	parts	of	a	whole	are	established	and	identified	as	the	whole,	 itself,	 a	 priori.	 Thus,	 the	 Deleuzian	 differential	 is	 based	 on	 difference	 “in	 itself”	(Deleuze	1994:	28).	Consequently,	the	Deleuzean	correlative	of	the	a	priori	of	form	and	substance	becomes	phenomenologically	cross-constituted	by	the	envisages	of	a	body	and	its	embedded	world.	As	a	result,	both	respond	to	the	uncertain	solicitations	of	a	milieu	that	instructs	its	rhythms,	behaviors,	and	sensitive	qualities.	Following	Deleuze,	the	co-constitution	of	sensible	quali-ties	are,	by	construction,	not	those	of	sensation	(as	affect	theory	would	have	us	believe)	but	intrinsic	signification.24	The	sensible,	from	the	very	beginning,	is	provided	with	a	meaning,	which	is	assigned	by	the	corporeal	matrix	which	institutes	it	(rather	than	its	specific	sign).		Beyond	navigating	the	differential	qua	coherence	vis-à-vis	behavioural	 fidelity	 to	 layer	orientation	and	interface-limited	hierarchical	behavioural	dependencies,	by	gleaning	Wilson	we	have	surreptitiously	also	tried	to	create	a	bricolage	with	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology	and	ontological	commitments	of	the	Quinean	ilk	which	are	also	demarcated	by	the	possibility	of	re-alignment.	I	argue	that	this	is	not	a	misreading	of	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology,	for	Deleuze	denies	 the	possibility	of	an	ultimate	Mechanosphere	that	captures	all	relations;	Deleuze’s	externality	necessarily	cannot	be	reduced	into	exhaustive	organic	or	biological	relations,	as	external	entities	are	not	self-caused	or	reducible	to	anything	else.	Deleuzean	externality	is	premised	upon	irreducibility.	Wilson’s	ontology	contends	with	the	Quinean	thesis	that	our	“ontological	commitments”	should	be	determined	by	assembling	our	various	worldly	claims	into	a	unified	theory	(much	like	the	machine	ontology)	but	surveys	any	amalgamated	corpus	for	 varied	 existential	 claims—sentences	of	 the	 form	 (∃x)α—that,	meanwhile,	 relationally	adapts.	Let	us	briefly	remark	on	relational	adaptation	of	media	and	behavioral	use.	Stiegler’s	work	on	technics	and	time	introduces	the	tertiary	retention	to	Husserlian	phenomenology	by	re-marking	upon	how	the	media	artefact	bears	a	transcendental	responsibility	within	our	“gen-eral	 organology”.	 This	 “lost	 limb”	 is	 a	 supplement	 in	 the	 Derridean	 sense:	 both	 an	
                                               24		 Jean-Louis	Schefer,	whose	writing	(on	cinema,	in	particular)	greatly	influenced	Deleuze,	describes	such	af-fects	as	“urgently	invisible,	non-represented,	and	unformulated”,	producing	a	“criminal	pleasure”,	whereby	“signification,	words	and	images	no	longer	represent	anyone”	(Schefer	2016:	196).	
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enhancement	and	a	substitute,	irreducibly	redistributed	along	the	materiality	of	supplemen-tation	and	inclusion	(bi-directional,	cyclic).	Stiegler	here	recalls	Simondon’s	allagmatic	ar-chitecture	of	technical	operation,	which	is	also	scalar—individuation	is	bound	up	in	both	the	individual	and	their	milieu,	with	technesis	forming	part	of	an	individual	and	their	transduc-tive	reality.	Neither	a	substantial	being	nor	an	element	in	a	rapport,	the	individual	is	first	and	foremost	the	reality	of	a	“metastable	relation”	(Simondon	2006:	79-80).	Media	and	man	are	caught	within	a	constructive	process,	as	the	individual	is	bound	up	in	a	progressively	condi-tioned	and	supra-organic	artefactual	technosphere	of	recomposition;	the	a	priori	is	revealed	not	as	absolute,	but	relative	to	the	local	process	of	compromise	between	organism	and	world	(i.e.,	“absolute	movement”;	Deleuze	1989:	40).	As	the	description	of	topological	stimuli-responsiveness	demonstrates,	technicity	is	also	a	cognitive	process	that	begins	with	cephalization	and	neuralization,	climbing	a	naturalized	scaffold	with	the	evolution	of	tool-use	and	language,	inaugurating	new	cognitive	technolo-gies.	This	 is	precisely	why	 in	Stanley	Kubrick’s	2001:	A	Space	Odyssey,	 the	black	monolith	appears	at	every	new	level	of	technicity,	indexing	historical	change	ineliminable	to	the	de-velopment	of	mankind.	As	Negarestani	remarks	in	Intelligence	and	Spirit,	our	cognitive	scaf-folding	is	bolstered	by	two	poles,	each	dealing	with	significant	problems	of	computation:	i)	the	qualitative	compression	and	stabilization	of	information	necessary	for	the	communal	es-tablishment	of	knowledge	and	its	augmentation	(e.g.,	the	bone-wielding	ape);	ii)	the	coordi-nation	for	understanding	and	action	(e.g.,	the	apes	shrieking	in	unison,	suggesting	the	even-tual	construction	of	language;	Negarestani	2018:	491).		In	turn,	the	teleologically	determined	nature	of	Intelligence	is	revealed:	how,	absent	a	con-trasting	index	for	differentiating	itself	(from	its	food,	environment,	or	technics)	does	the	or-ganism	(which	risks	autophagy)	differentiate	itself	from	space?	One	answer	has	been	histor-ically	 tethered	to	the	development	and	extension	of	our	(central	and	autonomic)	nervous	system,	which	 provides	 us	with	 the	 prowess	 to	 designate	 spatial	 differentiation	 through	“perspectival	 pure	 positional	 awareness	 of	 items-in-relation-to-one-another”	 (Rosenberg	1993:	111;	Moynihan	2019).	Another	is	with	language.	Both	deal	with	the	making-discrete	in	cyclical	logic.	Deleuze’s	 introduction	 of	 dynamicity	 foregrounds	 the	 intermilieux	 and	 transobjective	process	of	virtualization	as	a	presignifying	rhythm,	a	faculty	of	transcoding	that	has	become	integral	for	considering	discretization	(as	it	applies	to	both	technics	and	language).	This,	too,	has	dialectical	roots:	Lautman’s	dialectic	instantiation	of	analysis	subordinated	to	topology	involved	structural	schemas	designated	along	a	striated	hierarchy	in	which	there	was	an	in-scribed	 “upper”	 logical	 level	 consisting	 of	 a	 “more	 simple	 and	 universal”	 assembly:	 “lo-cal/global,	 intrinsic/extrinsic,	 discrete/continuous”	 (Lautman	 2006:	 xxvii).	 It	 is	 from	Lautman	that	Deleuze	inherits	the	conception	of	the	eternal	return	of	the	“not-yet-present”	
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and	“passive	synthesis”	as	a	topographic	genesis	of	environmental	embedding	(which	lies	in	
between	environment	and	context,	thus	existing	as	a	differential	marker).25	As	perhaps	best	demarcated	in	Carl	Boyer’s	The	History	of	the	Calculus	and	its	Conceptual	
Development,	the	differential	can	be	understood	as	a	“point	of	view”,	or	as	perceptually-nav-igating	infinitesimal	difference	between	the	consecutive	values	of	a	continuously	diminish-ing	quantity,	as	in	Zeno’s	paradox	(Boyer	1939:	2).	Simon	Duffy	describes	the	becoming-de-rivative	as	an	infinite	process	of	determining	the	“vanishing	quantity”	(Duffy	2016:	119).	In	Deleuze’s	work	on	aesthetics	and	Francis	Bacon’s	paintings,	we	see	the	finitude	of	individu-ality	understood	through	the	framework	of	this	“vanishing	point”	(point	de	fuite),	the	“second	direction	of	exchange”	that	orients	the	virtual’s	dissipation	into	material	(and	thus	“function-ing	as	a	prosthesis-organ”;	Deleuze	1987:	17-18).		Lautman	work	on	the	transfinite	proved	to	be	the	historical	nexus	for	differential	hetero-genesis	as	a	theoretical	fulcrum	and	marks	the	beginning	of	Deleuze’s	mereological	awaken-ing,	whereby	“[t]he	concept	of	the	infinitely	small	as	vanishing	quantities	allows	the	deter-mination	of	relations	independently	of	their	terms”	(Duffy	2006:	120).	Following	Lautman,	the	penetration	of	topological	methods	into	differential	geometry	responds	to	relations	be-tween	the	“local	and	the	global”,	or	“the	whole	and	the	part”,	where	the	outlining	of	schemata	involves	the	passage	between	material	realizations	through	a	formal	system	(Cavaillès	and	Lautman	1939).	Therefore,	our	Deleuzean	study	of	differential	heterogenesis	is	invariably	concerned	with	the	reduction	of	the	extrinsic	properties	of	a	situation	to	intrinsic	structural	properties:	 this	 calculus	of	 variation	determines	 the	existence	of	meta-linguistic	 artefact-wielding	beings	who,	ourselves,	are	entangled	within	the	evolutionary	development	of	be-coming-discrete.	Lautman’s	dialectic,	which	concerns	the	transformative	prowess	of	inverse	reciprocity,	thus	infects	the	vagaries	of	Intelligence,	whether	it	be	the	description	of	objects	or	our	boot-strapping.	
	
	
§	Appendix	(On	Causality)		However	we	approach	it,	the	kinematics	informing	Deleuzean	differential	heterogenesis	define	the	virtual	as	strictly	a	part	of	the	real	object—virtuality	is	necessarily	relational.	What	else,	then,	is	to	be	said	of	our	differential	positioning,	caught	in	virtual-actual	objective	be-coming(s)?	If	the	endocentric	(or	egocentric)	frame	of	self-centered	reference	allows	for	dif-ferentiation	between	environment,	object,	language,	and	self,	it	is	the	exocentric	dynamicity	of	the	differential	frame	that	challenges	the	ego’s	fixity	by	suggesting	post-anthropic	spatial	relations	(i.e.,	contracting	into	larger	assemblages	and	becoming	a	language-speaker,	tool-
                                               25		 Accordingly,	for	Deleuze	the	first	synthesis	of	time	is	the	time	of	habitudes,	the	Humean	time	of	materialized	logical	relations;	the	second	synthesis	of	time	is	the	active	and	passive	synthesis	of	memory;	the	third	syn-thesis	of	time	is	the	repetition	“by	excess,	the	repetition	of	the	future	as	eternal	return”	(Deleuze	1994:	90).	
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wielder,	 computer-programmer,	 and	 so	 on).26	 This	 always	 observationally	appears	 to	 be	causally	construed.	As	René	Thom’s	work	on	topological	structural	stability	indicates,	we,	as	predators	situatedness	in	space,	are	constrained	to	an	allocentric	view	of	embeddedness	that	we	relate	to	through	causality—"we	believe	in	causality	because	we	have	been	conditioned	phylogenetically	to	do	so	by	the	regularity	with	which	phenomena	succeed	one	another	in	the	physical	world”	(Thom	1990:	7).		In	Sarti	and	Citti’s	work	on	the	intersection	on	“non-vanishing	sums”,	matter	is	situated	
outside	the	realm	of	knowledge,	“simply	because	knowledge	is	concerned	only	with	the	rela-tions	of	‘cohesion,’”	while,	simultaneously,	“matter	is	nonetheless	conceptualizable,	for,	be-ing	therefore	liable	to	‘receive’	forms,	it	must	indeed	have	qualities	that	ensure	its	reception”	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	16-17).27	As	in	cinema	voyeurism	and	multiscalar	modelling,	differential	Deleuzianism	allows	us	to	readily	conceive	of	that	which	is	devoid	of	form	or	homogeneous	reference	in	bottom-up	or	top-down	direction,	scaling	its	way	not	only	out	of	knowledge	but	out	of	any	referential/observational	purview	(i.e.,	“out	of	sight”)	until	homogenized.	In	turn,	differential	 heterogenesis	 allows	 us	 to	 resituate	 the	 contingent-becoming	 of	 the	 a	 priori,	which	was	provincially	occluded	by	Kant’s	understanding	of	the	self-substantiating	and	al-ready-present	“at	hand”	analytic.		Sarti	and	Citti’s	analysis	of	progressive	polarization	in	heterogenetic	flows	invigorates	a	kind	of	dynamic	evolution	where	a	virtual	topos	is	revealed	to	underly	the	configuration	of	the	virtual.	Thus,	the	virtual	is	abducted	by	the	noumenal	real,	where	it	finds	itself	anchored	by	an	ontogenetic	identity-relation.	No	longer	are	we	circumscribed	to	the	province	of	real	numbers	and	the	stable	conditions	of	cognition,	as	in	Kant’s	system	of	pure	intuiting.	Instead,	differential	heterogenesis	galvanizes	Solomon	Maïmon’s	criticism	of	Kant	for	being	unable	to	provide	for	any	account	of	how	genesis	facilitates	the	conditions	of	knowledge.	Mathematicians	such	as	Bernard	Teissier,	Giuseppe	Longo	and	Jean	Petitot	have	examined	phylogenetically-conditioned	causality	as	it	concerns	continuous	computation	(returning	to	the	problems	riddling	Turing’s	continuous	state-machine).	For	instance,	in	Teissier’s	work	on	“Protomathematics,	Perception	and	the	Meaning	of	Mathematical	Objects”	(1996),	we	see	how	it	may	be	possible	to	claim	that	the	evolution	of	our	perceptual	systems	has	created	an	isomorphism	between	the	visual	 line	and	the	vestibular	 line.	This	(geodesic)	mark	of	 the	discrete	demonstrates	the	stronghold	of	internalist-representationalist	habituation,	where	functionally-unmoored	 causality	 seems	 to	 impart	 us	 with	 imagining	 the	 non-human,	 a	terrain	that	creeps	beyond	“[t]he	regularity	with	which	phenomena	succeed	one	another	in	
                                               26		 Thus,	the	(central	and	autonomic)	nervous	system	is	inextricably	bound	to	teleological	activity,	where	me-dia-prostheses	and	stimuli-responsiveness	are	affixed	within	a	closed	loop	related	to	the	problem	of	self-preservation.	27		 Sarti	and	Citti	define	an	assemblage	operator	as	based	on	the	intersection	of	two	sets:	(Bp0	,	Fp0)	⋂	(Bp1	,	Fp1).	The	pair	demonstrate	that,	much	like	a	corollary	to	vibration,	“differential	becoming	is	the	flow”	of	the	so-lution’s	integrate	operator;	the	“axes	of	cohesion”	produce	a	genesis	of	semiotic	functioning	where	the	plas-tic	composition	of	assemblages	reveals	that	“flux	is	at	the	base”	of	harmonic	embedding	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	16-19).	
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the	physical	world”	(Thom	1990:	7).	We	can	create	a	bricolage	here	if,	for	instance,	we	do	not	 accept	 that	 any	 phenomena’s	 “being	 caused”	 by	 certain	 stimuli	 is	 equipollent	 to	constituting	 phenomenal	 characters	 (e.g.,	 colour	 experiences).28	What,	 then,	 if	 we	 apply	differential	 heterogenesis	 to	 abduct	 the	 principles	 of	 human	 cognition	 and	 transmogrify	them	 so	 as	 to	 produce	 a	 proto-perceptual	 theory	 of	 retroactive	 observation,	 considering	what	Ned	Block	terms	“mental	paint”	in	order	to	schematically	imagine	the	differential	in	terms	of	quantum	computing/computing	in	continua.	Is	there	any	relation,	then,	between	the	 feed-forward	adequation	of	deep	 learning	and	non-accessible	 (and	non-phenomenal)	properties	behind	externalism	(i.e.,	what	Ned	Block	terms	“mental	oil”)?29	Such	problems	bear	further	consideration.	This	differential	consideration	of	truth-contingency	gives	us	a	computational	corollary	for	challenging	paradigms	of	causality.	According	to	Lev	Manovich,	it	is	the	causal	narrative	that,	as	a	cultural	object,	 foregrounds	the	 logical	perturbations	underlying	algorithms,	web	 in-dexes,	computer	storage,	CD-ROM’s,	web	sites,	and	other	new	media	objects	which	are	“or-ganized	as	databases”	 (Manovich	1999:	85).	Manovich’s	model	of	 causality	 considers	 the	“storage-and-retrieval”	modality	as	our	epochal	archetype,	for	“the	computer	age	brought	with	it	a	new	cultural	algorithm:	reality	à	media	à	data	à	database”	(85).	However,	today’s	machines	are	not	characterized	by	linear	causality	but	stochastic	elasticity—consider	Pre-dictive	Processing	algorithms,	approximate	Bayes	optimality,	Markov	chains,	Hopfield	Net-works,	Boltzmann	machines,	and	so	on.30		A	short	survey	of	cybernetic	history	designates	the	classical	Church-Turing	thesis’	“com-putable	reals”	and	first-order	cybernetics’	treatment	of	information	as	stilted	on	the	closed	loop	 of	 “storage-and-retrieval”.	 In	 both	 instances,	 autopoiesis	 takes	 on	 a	 radical	
                                               28		 Consider	the	following	description:	“[t]he	functionalist	can	appeal	to	temporary	differences.	Erisa	will	say	‘The	wall	is	now	the	same	color	that	adorned	the	table	a	second	ago,’	and	‘For	one	second,	the	floor	matched	the	sofa.’	But	these	beliefs	are	fleeting,	so	how	can	they	constitute	the	abiding	differences	between	the	phe-nomenal	character	of	her	experience	of	red	and	green?	The	differences	between	these	phenomenal	charac-ters	stay	the	same	(for	us)	from	moment	to	moment,	day	to	day,	and	there	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	the	same	cannot	be	true	for	Erisa.	The	point	of	the	thought	experiment	is	to	make	it	plausible	that	color	experi-ences	can	remain	just	as	vivid	and	the	differences	between	them	just	as	permanent	as	they	are	for	us	even	if	the	functional	differences	between	them	attenuate	to	nothing	that	could	plausibly	constitute	those	differ-ences.	Of	course,	there	is	one	abiding	difference	in	functional	role	between	the	experience	of	red	and	the	experience	of	green—the	properties	of	the	stimuli.	Since	we	are	talking	about	internalist	representationism,	the	stimuli	will	have	to	be,	e.g.	light	hitting	the	retina	rather	than	colored	surfaces.	But	these	differences	in	the	stimuli	are	what	cause	the	differences	in	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience,	not	what	constitutes	those	phenomenal	differences.	I	don’t	expect	diehard	functionalists	to	recant	in	response	to	this	point,	but	I	really	don’t	see	how	anyone	with	an	open	mind	could	take	the	being	caused	by	certain	stimuli	as	consti-tuting	phenomenal	characters	of	color	experiences”	(Block	2003:	168).	29		 That	is,	can	we	attend	to	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	so	as	to	distinguish	mental	properties	of		experience?	These	 properties	 are	 involved	 in	 orgasm-experience,	 pain,	and	 other	bodily	 sensations	 but	might	differential	heterogenesis	provide	us	a	novel	“border	concept”	with	which	to	theorize	the	“mental	oil”	with	which	we	“paint”	the	redness	of	the	tomato?	30		 These	are	predicated,	in	their	computative	development,	upon	principles	such	as	Helmholtzian	interference,	noise	reduction,	and	the	Shannon-Ashby	Law	of	Requisite	Variety.		
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constructivist	rule	(of	perception),	denying	the	existence	of	an	externalist	representational	reality	that	affects	a	system	vis-à-vis	exocentric	indices	of	“information”.	However,	a	critical	rift	in	physics	and	computation	soon	necessitated	a	critical	revision,	with	newfound	relativ-ity	 and	 thermodynamics	 directing	 the	 “Church–Turing–Deutsch	 principle”	 to	 account	 for	holographic	boundaries	and	the	entropic	interference	characterizing	Bolzmann-Bekenstein	limits.	Following	second-order	cybernetics	(or	observer-oriented	cybernetics),	the	reparam-eterization	of	the	system	and	allocentric	regulation	took	precedent	over	recursion.		Contemporaneous	 research	 in	 neural	 computation	 and	 theoretical	 computer	 science	demonstrates	that	the	heterogenetic	flow	of	spatial	differentiation	in	deposing	of	inference-based	classification	systems	is	by	no	means	termed	along	the	striated	database’s	“storage-and-retrieval”	modality.	Inductive	neural	network	modelling	stresses	precise	node-localiza-tion	and	statistical	estimation	techniques:	from	elastic	bunch	graph-matching	in	biometric	protocol,	 such	 as	 facial	 recognition	 and	 fingerprint	matching	 software,	 to	 derivative-free	computational	 optimization	 in	 actuarial	 insurance	 AGIs	 and	 Unmanned	 Aerial	 Vehicles	(UAVs),	signal-to-noise	azimuthal	performance	coordinates	and	multiple	differential	phase-of-arrival	measures	make	use	of	filtering-and-tracking	algorithms	that	account	for	the	con-vergence	 of	 precision	 performance	 with	 complex	 coefficient	 wave-variation.	 Differential	elasticity’s	predictive	processing	power	has	outstripped	the	database	model’s	lamina,	such	that	the	causal	network	of	computational	states	shows	functional	organization	as	multiply	realizable;	accordingly,	 there	 is	a	 level	of	organization	above	the	 level	of	physiology	(viz.,	“mental”	or	“computational”)	that	determines	narrow	intentional	content.		Concomitant	to	convolutional	“neural	networking”	and	deep	learning,	our	media	para-digm-shift	has	divulged	that	machines	are,	in	fact,	agents	determinately	bound	within	a	field	of	“pathologically	distorted”	techniques	and	part	of	a	network	of	relations,	indexing	how	eco-nomic	calculations	convert	the	machinic	function	“from	mechanical-technical	to	perceptual-economic”	as	in	the	example	of	cinematic	performance	capture	(which,	much	like	in	Andy	Serkis’	infamous	roles,	uses	predictive	motion	capture	that	infers	to	simulated	digital	envi-ronments	in	real-time;	Koch	2019:	7;	Erkan	2019:	228).		Traditionally,	the	causal	terms	of	“machine	learning”	have	not	been	adequate	to	describe	exactly	how	organisms	are	world-models,	themselves,	as	function-modelling	research	in	cor-tical	conductor-based	generative	neural	networks	delineates	(Hinton	et	al.	2011;	Mountcas-tle	1997;	Jaeger	2001).	As	computer	scientists	such	as	Joscha	Bach	have	demonstrated	via	“cortical	conductor	theory”,	any	notion	of	“organic”	autonoetic	cognition	is	a	transcendental	illusion,	“a	cavern	within	which	an	inverted	image	of	the	real	holds	sway,	one	that	prevents	us	from	penetrating	to	the	imperceptible	conditions	of	perception	(the	virtual)”	(Brassier	in	Somers-Hall	2018:	264).	Despite	our	experiences	are	directed	outwards,	they	exist	before-hand	 in	 a	 primordial	 dream-like	 assemblage—phenomenal	 consciousness	 “is	 the	 recon-struction	of	a	dream	generated	[by]	more	than	fifty	brain	areas,	reflected	in	the	protocol	of	a	single	region”	(Bach	2018:	5).	Our	cognitive	processes	combine	visual	objects,	para-linguistic	
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maps,	and	procedural	dynamics	into	a	“persistent	dynamic	simulation,	which	can	be	used	to	continuously	 predict	 perceptual	 patterns	 at	 our	 systemic	 interface	 to	 the	 environment”	(Bach	2018:	4).	As	 in	Predictive	Processing,	 the	processing	 stream	of	bottom-up	cuing	of	perceptual	hypotheses	(such	as	objects	or	situations)	is	matched	by	a	“topdown	verification”	of	these	hypotheses	(through	the	simulative	capacity	of	the	neocortex),	where	the	“binding	of	 the	 features”	 is	 cohesively	modelled.	Research	 concerning	our	neural	 cortical	 columns	shows	that	it	here	that	we	model	compositional	approximation	and	reward	distribution,	as	is	the	case	with	inductive	machine	learning,	but	our	brain	can	still	perform	most	of	its	func-tions	without	the	presence	of	the	conductor	(Bodovitz	2008,	Safavi	2014,	Del	Cul	2009).31	Severed	from	our	cortical	conductors,	the	functor	between	our	neuroplasticity	and	machine	learning’s	processual	input,	“we	are	sleep	walkers”,	capable	of	coordinated	perceptual	and	motor	action,	but	without	central	coherence	and	reflection	(Bach	2018:	4).	Bayesian	interpretations	of	cognition	suggest	that,	as	we	contract	events	and	repetitions,	we	are	 simultaneously	optimizing	our	predictive	model;	 at	 the	 infinitesimal	 scale,	Bach’s	“cortical	conductor	theory”	evinces	that	the	formal-computational	reformulation	of	induc-tive	reasoning	can	persist	beyond	 the	stronghold	of	prior	probability	metrics.	Differential	heterogenesis	thus	provides	us	with	a	dialectical	method	to	contract	these	ideas	into	virtual	relation	and	a	naturalized	“scientific	image”.	Further	considerations,	which	we	do	not	pos-sess	the	prolixity	to	attend	to	at	this	time	but	which	my	dear	colleagues	have	prudently	en-deavored	over	with	their	incisive	philosophical	scalpels,	are	elaborately	examined	in	this	is-sue	of	La	Deleuziana.	For	 instance,	one	would	be	wise	to	 turn	to	“Escaping	the	Network”,	where	Anna	Longo	takes	up	evolutionary	game	theory	as	a	framework	to	move	beyond	the	biological	modelling	of	populations,	considering	the	“network	society”	vide	complexification	through	technologically-tethered	normative	schemes	of	action.				
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